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SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis is to study algorithmic questions that arise in the context
of game theory and microeconomics. In particular, we investigate the computational com-
plexity of various economic solution concepts by using and advancing methodologies from
the fields of combinatorial optimization and approximation algorithms.
We first study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents,
who express preferences over combinations of items through their utility functions. Several
objectives have been considered in the economic literature in different contexts. In fair
division theory, a desirable outcome is to minimize the envy or the envy-ratio between any
pair of players. We use tools from the theory of linear and integer programming as well
as combinatorics to derive new approximation algorithms and hardness results for various
types of utility functions. A different objective that has been considered in the context
of auctions, is to find an allocation that maximizes the social welfare, i.e., the total utility
derived by the agents. We construct PCP-based reductions from multi-prover proof systems
to obtain hardness results, given standard assumptions for the utility functions of the agents.
We then consider equilibrium concepts in games. We derive the first subexponential
algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in 2-player noncooperative games. We
extend our result to multi-player games and we further propose a second algorithm based
on solving polynomial equations over the reals. Both algorithms improve the previously
known upper bounds on the complexity of the problem.
Finally, we study game theoretic models that have been proposed recently to address
incentive issues in Internet routing. We obtain a polynomial time algorithm for computing
equilibria in such games, i.e., routing schemes and payoff allocations from which no subset
of agents has an incentive to deviate. Our algorithm is based on linear programming duality




The interaction of economic agents has become a fundamental paradigm in computer science
applications. The expansion of the Internet and the world wide web have led to numerous
examples including electronic commerce (e.g. web auctions), Internet routing, network
design and other related problems on multi-agent systems. It is therefore natural that the
modern theory of algorithms should adopt game theoretic models to analyze applications
as above.
Game theory and economics have been rich in providing models and solution concepts
as well as in prescribing strategies for rational agents. However, the outcomes proposed by
the economic theory often involve optimization problems with no known efficient solutions.
Resolving such complexity questions is a challenge for the evolving field of algorithmic game
theory and requires a combination of methodologies from computer science and economics.
The purpose of this thesis is to study algorithmic aspects of game theory and microe-
conomics. In particular, we investigate the computational complexity of various economic
solution concepts. We have chosen representative problems from different areas of eco-
nomics such as fair division, auction design and computation of equilibria in games and
in many cases, we develop approximation algorithms or provide inapproximability results.
Some of the main tools used include combinatorial methods, theory of linear and integer
programming, and probabilistic techniques. Below we briefly describe the problems that we
consider along with our contribution and the methodologies used.
1.1 Problems studied - Techniques and Contributions
In the second chapter, we study fair division questions from an algorithmic perspective. Fair
division is a central topic in economic theory with numerous applications in everyday life.
Ever since the first attempt for a mathematical treatment of the topic by Steinahus, Banach
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and Knaster [98], a vast literature on cake-cutting algorithms and allocations of divisible
goods has emerged (see among others [15] and [87]). In the case of indivisible goods however,
different techniques are required and very few algorithmic results are known. We (jointly
with R. Lipton, E. Mossel and A. Saberi) study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible
goods to a set of agents who express preferences over combinations of items through their
utility functions. Our fairness criterion is to minimize the envy among the agents. We derive
approximation algorithms and hardness results for various types of utility functions. In the
case of identical and additive utilities, we use techniques from the theory of linear and integer
programming as well as combinatorial tools to obtain a polynomial time approximation
scheme. In the case of non-additive utilities, we use information theoretic arguments to show
(unconditionally) that an exponential amount of communication is required to compute the
optimal solution. We also show that our results hold for other allocation models in which
we have a combination of divisible and indivisible goods (e.g. in partitioning measurable
spaces with atoms [22]).
In the third chapter we study optimization problems that arise in the design of com-
binatorial auction protocols. Lately, a large volume of transactions is conducted through
auctions including, among others, selling spectrum licenses, treasury bills and even flowers
in Dutch auctions. In a combinatorial auction, a set of indivisible goods is to be sold to a
set of agents. The most desirable outcome from an economic point of view is to pick the
allocation that maximizes the social welfare, i.e., the total utility derived by the agents.
We (jointly with S. Khot, R. Lipton and A. Mehta) derive inapproximability results when
the agents have submodular utility functions. Submodularity can be seen as the discrete
analog of concavity and is a natural property in many economic settings since it expresses
the fact that an agent’s utility gets saturated as we allocate more goods to him. We show
that the problem is not approximable with a factor better than 1 − 1/e, unless P= NP.
Our result is based on the PCP theorem and on constructing reductions from multi-prover
proof systems for MAX-3-COLORING.
In the fourth chapter we investigate the complexity of computing Nash equilibria in
noncooperative games. Noncooperative game theory has been extensively used to analyze
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interactions among selfish players. The dominant concept of rationality in noncooperative
games is the Nash equilibrium, a behavior from which no player has an incentive to deviate
(unilaterally). Polynomial time algorithms for equilibria however are still elusive and there
is a need to develop an algorithmic theory of equilibria. Rationality properties of a solution
do not suffice if computing an equilibrium is an intractable problem. People in practice tend
to follow strategies that are simple and easy to compute, therefore complexity issues should
be taken into consideration. We obtain the currently best upper bounds for computing
approximate Nash equilibria. In particular, we (jointly with R. Lipton and A. Mehta)
derive the first subexponential algorithm for 2-player and constant-player games, by using
probabilistic techniques. We also identify cases where exact equilibria are polynomial time
computable such as games with low rank payoff matrices. In a subsequent work, we (jointly
with R. Lipton) provide another algorithm for multi-player games, based on results for
finding solutions of polynomial equations. The second algorithm improves the dependence
on the degree of approximation and the number of players at the expense of raising the
dependence on the number of strategies.
Finally, in the fifth chapter, we study a game theoretic model for addressing incen-
tive issues in Internet routing. The Internet is composed of many administrative domains
(Autonomous Systems, ASes) each of which can be seen as an agent trying to route its
customers’ traffic and maximize its own benefit. As an attempt to model the interaction of
these entities, Papadimitriou [82] proposed the following cooperative game: Given a multi-
commodity flow satisfying capacity and demand constraints, the total payoff derived is the
amount of flow routed (or more generally a function of the flow routed). An outcome of
the game is a feasible multicommodity flow along with an allocation of the total payoff to
the players. The dominant solution concept in cooperative games is the notion of the core,
which consists of outcomes that are stable against deviations from any subset of agents. We
(jointly with A. Saberi) show that under this model, the core is nonempty, i.e., there exists
a routing scheme of the demand traffic and an allocation of the total payoff such that no
subset of ASes has an incentive to secede from the scheme. We further obtain a polynomial
3
time algorithm to compute such an outcome. Our algorithm is based on an economic inter-
pretation of the dual variables of the multicommodity flow linear program and the payoff
allocation is obtained by solving the dual program. We also extend our result to the case





Fair division is a central topic in economic theory with numerous applications in everyday
life. The first attempt for a mathematical treatment of the problem was made by the Polish
school of mathematicians (Steinhaus, Banach, and Knaster [98]) and was the source of many
interesting questions. Over the past fifty years, a vast literature has emerged (see [15, 87]
for a summary of related results) and several notions of fairness have been suggested.
The fairness criterion that we focus on is the amount of envy between any pair of players.
An allocation is envy-free if and only if every player likes his own share at least as much as
the share of any other player. The class of envy-free allocations as a solution concept was
introduced by Foley [36] and Varian [101] and has been studied extensively since then in
the economic literature [87, 15]. However, in most of the models considered so far, either
all goods are divisible or there is at least one divisible good, e.g. money, so that players
can compensate each other and achieve envy-freeness [1, 100]. We believe that indivisibility
issues should be taken into consideration.
We study the problem of allocating m indivisible goods to a set of n players in a fair
manner. When goods are indivisible, an envy-free allocation may not exist and we wish to
find allocations with upper bounds on the envy. In our model, each player p has a certain
utility value vp(S) for each subset S of the goods. Given an allocation of the goods to the
players, a player p envies player q if her valuation for the bundle given to player q is more
than her valuation for her own bundle. In that case, her envy is the difference.
2.1.1 Our Results
We first show that there always exists an allocation with maximum envy at most α, where
α is the maximum marginal utility of the goods, i.e., the value by which the utility of a
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player is increased when one more good is added to her bundle. Assuming that we have
oracle access to the players’ utilities, we give an O(mn3) time algorithm for producing a
desired allocation. The problem of finding allocations with bounded envy in the presence of
indivisible goods was introduced in [22] and a bound of O(αn3/2) was obtained. Our bound
is a substantial improvement and it is also tight.
We then look at the optimization problem of computing allocations with minimum
possible envy. We show that in most cases the problem is hard. First, using a similar
argument as in [77], we show that any algorithm needs exponential time to obtain enough
information about the valuations of players even if the valuations are provided via an oracle.
We then look at the special case of additive utilities, i.e., vp(S) =
∑
i∈S vp({i}). Even in
this case we prove that for any constant c, there can be no 2m
c
-approximation algorithm
for the minimum envy problem, unless P = NP.
We believe that a more suitable objective function is the maximum envy-ratio. The
envy-ratio of player p for player q is the utility of p for q’s bundle over her utility for her
own bundle. If all players have the same utility function, the problem is closely related to a
class of scheduling problems on identical processors. If we think of the players as identical
machines and the set of goods as a set of jobs, then our problem is equivalent to scheduling
the jobs so as to minimize the ratio of the maximum completion time over the minimum
completion time. In [17] it is shown that Graham’s greedy algorithm [40] achieves an
approximation factor of 1.4 for the envy-ratio problem. We improve this result and derive
a polynomial time approximation scheme.
Finally the issue of incentive compatibility is addressed. We prove that any algorithm
that produces an allocation with minimum envy cannot be truthful. We also show that
randomly allocating the goods to the players results in an allocation with envy at most
O(
√
α n1/2+ε) with high probability.
2.2 Model, Definitions and Notation
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of players and M = {1, 2, ..., m} be a set of indivisible
goods. A utility function vp is associated with each player p. For S ⊆ M , vp(S) is the
6
happiness player p derives if she obtains the subset S. We assume that vp is non-negative
and monotone i.e. vp(S) ≤ vp(T ) for every S ⊆ T and every p.
An allocation A is a partition of the goods A = (A1, A2, ..., An) where ∪np=1Ap = M
and Ap ∩ Aq = ∅ for all p 6= q. The subset Ap denotes the set of goods allocated to player
p. Note that some of the sets Ap may be empty. A partial allocation will be a partition of
some subset of M .
Given an allocation A = (A1, A2, . . . , An), we say that player p envies player q if she
prefers the bundle allocated to q to her own i.e. vp(Ap) < vp(Aq). We will denote by epq
the envy of p for q:
epq(A) = max{0, vp(Aq)− vp(Ap)}.
We define e(A) to be the maximum envy between any pair of players.
e(A) = max{epq(A), p, q ∈ N}.
We will often omit the parameter A in the notation.
2.3 Existence of Allocations with Bounded Maximum Envy
A natural question is whether there exist allocations with bounded envy. We obtain a
bound on the envy in terms of the maximum marginal utility of the goods. The marginal
utility of a good i with respect to a player p and a subset of goods S, is the amount by




vp(S ∪ {i})− vp(S)
In addition to proving a bound on the envy, we present an efficient algorithm that
computes a desired allocation. For that, we assume that the algorithm can ask an oracle
for the utility of a player p for any subset S.
Theorem 1 For any set of goods and any set of players, there exists an allocation A such
that the maximum envy of A is bounded by the maximum marginal utility of the goods, α.
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Furthermore, given oracle access for the utility functions of the players, there is an O(mn3)
time algorithm for finding such an allocation.
Given an allocation A, we define the envy graph of A as follows: every node of the graph
represents a player and there is a directed edge from p to q if and only if p envies q. The
proof of Theorem 1 is based on the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 For any partial allocation A with envy graph G, we can find another partial
allocation B with envy graph H such that:
• e(B) ≤ e(A),
• H is acyclic.
Proof :
If G has no directed cycles, we are done. Suppose that C = p1 → p2 → · · · → pr → p1 is
a directed cycle inG. If A = {A1, ..., An}, we can obtain A′ = (A′1, ...A′n) by re-allocating the
goods as follows: A′p = Ap for all p /∈ {p1, . . . , pr}, andA′p1 = Ap2 , A
′
p2 = Ap3 , . . . , A
′
pr = Ap1 .
Note that all players evaluate what they have in A′ at least as much as what they have
in A. Therefore it is easy to see that e(A′) ≤ e(A).
We can also show that the number of edges in the envy graph G′ corresponding to A′
has decreased. To see this, first note that the set of the edges between pairs of vertices in
N \ C has not changed. Also every edge of the form p → pj for p ∈ N \ C and pj ∈ C
has now become the edge p → pj−1 (or p → pr if j = 1) in G′ and no more edges of this
form have been added. The number of edges of the form pj → p has either decreased or
remained the same since players in C are strictly happier. Finally for pi ∈ C the number
of edges from pi to vertices in C has decreased by at least 1.
Thus by repeatedly removing cycles using the above procedure, we will obtain an allo-
cation B with corresponding envy graph H such that e(B) ≤ e(A) and H is acyclic. Since
the number of edges decreases at every step, the process will terminate. 2
Proof of Theorem 1 : We give an algorithm that produces the desired allocation. The
algorithm proceeds in m rounds. At each round one more good is allocated to some player.
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In the first round, we allocate good 1 to some player arbitrarily. Clearly the maximum
envy is at most α. Suppose at the end of round i, the goods {1, ..., i} have been allocated
to the players and the maximum envy is at most α. At round i + 1, we construct the
envy graph corresponding to the current allocation. We use the procedure of Lemma 2 to
obtain an allocation A in which the maximum envy is at most α and the new envy graph
G is acyclic. Since G is acyclic, there is a player p ∈ N with in-degree 0, which implies
that nobody envies p. We then allocate good i + 1 to p. Let B = (B1, ..., Bn) be the new
allocation. For any 2 players q, r with q, r 6= p, eqr(B) = eqr(A) ≤ α. For q ∈ N \ {p}, since
eqp(A) = 0 we have:
eqp(B) = max{0, vq(Ap ∪ {i})− vq(Aq)}
≤ max{0, α+ vq(Ap)− vq(Aq)} ≤ α
The analysis for the running time of the algorithm is straightforward. In Lemma 2, we
keep removing cycles until the envy-graph is acyclic. Finding a cycle and removing it takes
at most O(n2) time and it decreases the number of edges by at least one. Initially the envy
graph has no edges. Allocating a good at any round adds at most n − 1 edges to the new
envy graph. Since every cycle removal decreases the number of edges, the number of times
we have to remove a cycle is at most O(nm) and the total running time is O(mn3). 2
In [22], a similar model has been defined with the difference that the utility function
of every player is additive and we have a combination of divisible and indivisible goods.
More formally, in [22] the problem is to partition a measurable space (Ω,F). Each player
has a utility function which is a probability measure vp on (Ω,F) such that for each vp
the maximum value of an atom is α. A subset S ⊆ Ω is an atom for vp if vp(S) > 0 and
∀E ⊂ S, either vp(E) = 0 or vp(E) = vp(S). It is shown that there exist allocations with
envy at most O(αn3/2).
We can prove that our result also holds for their model and hence it improves the bound
of O(αn3/2) to α. The idea is that we can partition Ω into indivisible goods of value at
most α and then apply Theorem 1. In particular, we use the following Lemma:
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Theorem 3 When the utilities of the players are probability measures on (Ω,F) = ([0, 1],
Borel sets) with atoms of value at most α, there exists a partition A = (A1, ..., An) of Ω
such that e(A) ≤ α.
Proof : Since each measure vp has atoms of value at most α, this means that for every
x ∈ [0, 1], vp({x}) ≤ α. The case α = 0 corresponds to an infinitely divisible cake and an
envy-free allocation always exists [22]. For α > 0 we can reduce the problem to allocating
indivisible goods of value at most α and then use Theorem 1.
Lemma 4 The interval [0, 1] can be partitioned in m disjoint sets S1, ..., Sm such that
m = O(n/α) and vp(Sj) ≤ α for every p = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ...,m
Proof : Find the minimum possible value for x ∈ [0, 1] such that vp([0, x]) ≤ α for every
player p. Such an x exists since atoms have value at most α. Set S1 = [0, x] and consider
the interval (x, 1]. Again find the minimum value of y ∈ (x, 1] such that vp((x, y]) ≤ α for
every p. Set S2 = (x, y]. We can continue in the same manner until we partition the whole
interval [0, 1]. It is easy to check that the number of disjoint intervals S1, S2, ..., Sm of the
partition will be O(n/α). 2
We can now treat the intervals S1, ..., Sm produced in the previous Lemma as indivisible
goods and Theorem 1 will complete the proof. 2
2.4 Minimizing Envy as an Optimization Problem
Although we can produce an allocation with bounded envy, in many instances the maxi-
mum envy can be smaller than α. Therefore we would like to look at the following two
optimization problems:
Problem 1: Minimum envy





Problem 2: Minimum envy-ratio






As we will see it is not always possible to have a polynomial time algorithm for computing
an optimal solution, hence we will also be interested in obtaining approximation algorithms.
Given a minimization problem Π, we say that an algorithm has an approximation factor of
ρ for Π, if for any instance I of Π, the algorithm outputs a solution which is guaranteed to
be at most ρ OPT (I), where OPT (I) is the optimal solution. We will say that an algorithm
is a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) if for any instance I and any error
parameter ε > 0, the algorithm runs in time polynomial in the input size and outputs a
solution which is at most (1 + ε)OPT (I). If in addition the running time is polynomial
in 1/ε then we say that the algorithm is a Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme
(FPTAS).
In the following theorem we show that any algorithm needs an exponential number of
queries in the worst case to produce an optimal solution. Our construction is similar to
Nisan and Segal [77].
Theorem 5 Any (deterministic) algorithm that computes an allocation with minimum envy
or minimum envy-ratio requires a number of queries which is exponential in the number of
goods in the worst case.
Proof : We give an outline of the proof. Suppose m = 2k. We consider the following
class of utility functions F . A function v is in F if:
v(S) = 0 for all S with |S| < k.
v(S) = 1 for all S with |S| > k.
v(S) = 1− v(S̄) for all |S| = k
Now, consider instances (v, v) in which there are two players with the same utility
function v for some v ∈ F . The number of such instances is doubly exponential in k. Since
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the algorithm asks only a polynomial number of queries, it can produce only an exponential
number of different query sequences. Therefore, there exist two different functions u, v ∈ F
such that the query sequences corresponding to the instances defined by u and v are the
same.
Consider the instances (u, v) and (v, u). The algorithm will produce the same query
sequences for both instances and therefore it will produce the same allocation for (u, v) and
(v, u). It is easy to see that although for either case, there exists an allocation which is
envy-free, there is no single allocation that is envy-free for both instances. 2
We would like to note that an interesting fact about Theorem 5 is that it is unconditional,
i.e., not dependent on any complexity theory assumption.
2.4.1 Additive Utilities
We consider a natural special case of the problem in which the utility functions of all
players are additive i.e. for all p ∈ N , vp(S) =
∑
i∈S vp({i}). In that case, an instance of
the problem is specified by an n×m matrix V = (vp,i).
2.4.1.1 The minimum envy problem
Still, the problem of finding a minimum-envy allocation is NP-hard, even when the number
of players is two. This follows from the fact that for two players with the same utility
functions, deciding whether an envy-free allocation exists is equivalent to deciding if there
exists a partition of a set of positive integers in two subsets of equal sum, which is NP-
complete [102].
Since the objective function of the minimum envy problem can be zero and since deciding
whether the minimum envy is zero is NP-complete, we cannot have any polynomial time
approximation algorithm, unless P = NP. One way to remedy this is to add 1 (or some
positive constant) to our objective function. In that case, Theorem 1 guarantees a (1 +α)-
approximation algorithm, where α = max vp,i. Even in this case though, strong hardness
results can be obtained. We can show that for any constant c, there is no 2m
c
-approximation
algorithm, unless P = NP. The proof is along the same lines as the inapproximability result
for the problem Subset-Sums Difference in [10] and we omit it.
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2.4.1.2 The minimum envy-ratio problem
We believe that a more suitable objective function is the envy-ratio. In the rest of this
section, we study the envy-ratio problem in the case where the players have the same utility
function. We will denote the utility that players derive from having good i by v(i).
This special case is closely related to a class of scheduling problems on identical proces-
sors. We can think of the set of players as a set of identical machines and the set of goods as
a set of m jobs to be scheduled on the machines. Every job has a positive processing time
and the load of every processor is the sum of the processing times of the jobs assigned to
it. Several objective functions have been considered such as minimizing the maximum com-
pletion time (makespan) [40, 44] or maximizing the minimum completion time [27, 106, 2].
Our problem is equivalent to minimizing the ratio of the maximum completion time over
the minimum completion time.
The following greedy algorithm was proposed by Graham for the minimum makespan
problem [40]: Sort the goods in decreasing order of their values and allocate them one
by one in that order. At every step, allocate the next good to the player whose current
bundle has the least value. In [17] it was proved (in the context of scheduling) that the
approximation factor of Graham’s algorithm is 1.4 for the ratio problem.
Theorem 6 [17] Graham’s algorithm achieves an approximation factor of 1.4 for the envy-
ratio problem.
In the next Theorem, we improve this result and show that we can achieve any constant
factor arbitrarily close to 1 for the envy-ratio problem.
Theorem 7 There is a PTAS for the envy-ratio problem when all players have the same
utility for each good.
Proof : Before going into the details of the proof we give a brief outline of the technique.
Our algorithm is similar to [2] and [106]. However our objective function does not fit in
their framework. The algorithm is as follows: Given our original instance, we round the
utility of each good to obtain a coarser instance in which there is a constant number of
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distinct utilities, i.e., a constant number of different types of goods. We then show that in
the new instance, we can find an optimal solution by searching, for every player, among
a constant number of distinct assignments of goods. The constant will be exponential in
the approximation parameter 1/ε. This observation enables us to compute the optimal
solution in the rounded instance by solving a series of integer programs with a constant
number of variables using Lenstra’s algorithm [64]. After finding an optimal allocation in
the rounded instance, we will convert it into an allocation for the original instance. In
the whole process, there are 2 sources of error: computing the rounded instance from the
original one and transforming the optimal allocation of the rounded instance to an allocation
of the original instance. We are able to bound the error by 1 + ε.
Let I be an instance of the problem, with n players, m goods and utility v(i) for good
i. If m < n then the optimal envy-ratio is ∞ and any allocation is optimal. Hence we can
assume without loss of generality that m ≥ n. We start with some basic facts about the
optimal solution.







If all the goods were divisible, we could allocate a fraction of 1/n from each good to a player
and everybody would receive a utility of exactly L.
We briefly sketch how to handle goods with utility greater than L. Suppose there exists
a good i with v(i) ≥ L. If i is assigned to a player p in an optimal allocation, then there
is an allocation with the same or less envy-ratio in which i is the only good allocated to p.
To see this, suppose that player p receives good i and some other good, say j in an optimal
solution. Let q be the person with minimum utility and bundle Smin. Then v(Smin) < L
and by giving good j to q, it is easy to see that the ratio does not increase, and hence the
new solution is also optimal. Therefore goods with high utility can be assigned to players
until we are left with goods that satisfy v(i) < L. This does not mean that if we have a
PTAS for the case when v(i) < L for all i, we can derive a PTAS for the general problem,
as is the case in [2]. Instead we will have to round ”big” goods appropriately so that in
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the rounded instance their utility is also higher than the corresponding average utility, L.
We will then output an optimal solution for the rounded instance in which such goods are
assigned to players with no other good in their bundle. We omit the details for handling
goods with v(i) ≥ L and from now on we will assume that v(i) < L for every i. We have
the following fact:
Claim 8 If v(i) < L for every good i, then there exists an optimal allocation A = (A1, ..., An)
such that 12L < v(Ai) < 2L.
The proof is by showing that in a given optimal solution, it is possible to reallocate the
goods so that the envy-ratio does not increase and the conditions of the claim are satisfied.
We will now describe how to round the values of the goods and obtain an instance in
which there is only a constant number of different types of goods (i.e. a constant number
of distinct values for the goods). The construction is the same as in [2].
We will denote the rounded instance by IR(λ), where λ is a positive constant and will
be determined later (λ will be O(1/ε)). We will often omit λ in the notation.
We first round the value of every good with relatively high value. In particular, for
every good i with v(i) > L/λ, we round v(i) to the next integer multiple of L/λ2. Roughly
this means that we round up the first least significant digits of v(i). We cannot afford to
do the same for goods with small value since the error introduced by this process might be
very big. Instead, let S be the sum of the values of the goods with value less than L/λ. We
round S to the next integer multiple of L/λ, say SR. Instance IR(λ) will have SRλ/L new
goods with value L/λ. This completes the construction. Note that in IR(λ) all values are
of the form kL/λ2, where λ ≤ k ≤ λ2. Hence we have only a constant number of distinct
values, since λ is a constant.
Let MR be the set of goods in the new instance and vR(i) be the value of each good.
Let LR = 1n
∑
j∈MR v
R(i). It is easy to see that L ≤ LR and that all values in IR(λ) are
at most LR. Hence by Claim 8 there is an optimal solution AR = (AR1 , ..., A
R
n ) such that
1
2L
R < v(ARp ) < 2L
R for every p. In the algorithm below we will search for such a solution.
We represent a player’s bundle by a vector t = (tλ, ..., tλ2), where tk is the number of
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goods with value kL/λ2 assigned to her. We will then say that the player is of type t. The
utility derived from t is v(t) =
∑
k tkkL/λ
2. Let U be the set of all possible types t, with
1
2L
R < v(t) < 2LR. It is easy to see that |U | is bounded by a constant which is exponential
in λ. Hence for a player of type t ∈ U , there is only a constant number of distinct values for
her utility. Let V (U) be the set of these values, i.e. V (U) = {u : v(t) = u for some t ∈ U}.
We can now show how to find the optimal envy-ratio in IR(λ). For all pairs of values
u1, u2 ∈ V (U), we will solve the following decision problem: Is there an allocation in which
the utility of every player is between u1 and u2? Since |V (U)| is constant, after solving the
above problem for all u1, u2 we can output the allocation corresponding to u∗1, u
∗
2 for which
the minimum ratio u∗2/u
∗
1 is attained.
To solve the decision problem, we will write an integer program (IP) with a constant
number of variables and use Lenstra’s algorithm [64]. In the following IP, for each t ∈ U we
have an integer variable Xt indicating how many players are of type t. The first constraint
implies that all players will obtain an allocation of type t ∈ U and the second that all goods
are assigned. It is obvious that the decision problem with inputs u1, u2 has a solution iff
the corresponding integer program is feasible. Therefore we can find the optimal solution
of IR(λ) in polynomial time. Note that the actual running time is exponential in λ which
is the reason why we will finally obtain a PTAS and not an FPTAS.
In the following IP, Uu2u1 is the set of all types t ∈ U such that u1 ≤ v(t) ≤ u2 and nk is





Xttk = nk ∀k
Xt ≥ 0 ∀Xt with t ∈ Uu2u1
Xt = 0 ∀Xt with t ∈ U \ Uu2u1
We need to see how the original instance is related to the rounded instance. The following
Lemma has been proved in [2]:
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Lemma 9 Let A = (A1, ..., An) be an allocation in I, where 12L < v(Ai) < 2L. Then there











Also if B = (B1, ..., Bn) is an allocation in IR such that 12L
R < v(Bi) < 2LR, then there










We are now ready to prove our Theorem. Our algorithm will be: Given instance I,
compute the instance IR, find an optimal allocation AR = (AR1 , ..., A
R
n ) for I
R, and then
convert AR to an allocation A = (A1, ..., An) for I using Lemma 9. Output A.
Suppose without loss of generality that v(AR1 ) ≤ ... ≤ v(ARn ) and v(A1) ≤ ... ≤ v(An).
Let A∗ = (A∗1, ..., A
∗
n) be an optimal solution to I satisfying the conditions of Claim 8 and
assume v(A∗1) ≤ ... ≤ v(A∗n). We want to show:
v(An)
v(A1)





By Lemma 9 we know that:
v(An) ≤ v(ARn ) +
1
λ
L ≤ v(ARn ) =
1
λ




















We need to relate the optimal solution in IR with the optimal solution in I. By using
the first part of Lemma 9 and by performing similar calculations we have that there exists

















Since AR is an optimal solution in IR the ratio in A′ will be at least as big as in AR.




















≤ (λ+ 1)(λ+ 2)(λ+ 3)
(λ− 2)(λ2 − 4λ− 4)
OPT
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Thus, if we set λ = 56/ε, it is easy to see that the factor will be at most 1 + ε.
2
2.5 Truthfulness
So far we have assumed that we can obtain the actual utilities of the players for the goods.
However, in many situations this is private information and the players may have incentives
to lie about their valuations in order to obtain a better bundle. We would like to investigate
the question of whether we can have mechanisms that elicit the true valuations from the
players and also produce allocations with minimum or bounded envy. A mechanism is
truthful if for every player, her profit is maximized by declaring her true utility, i.e., being
truthful is a dominant strategy.
Truthful mechanisms have been the subject of research especially in the context of
auctions. However, unlike our problem, auction mechanisms are allowed to compensate the
players with money to ensure truthfulness.
We present a simple argument to prove that any mechanism that computes a minimum-
envy allocation cannot be truthful even in the special case where the utility functions are
additive.
Theorem 10 Any mechanism that returns an allocation with minimum possible envy is
not truthful.
Proof : LetM be a mechanism that outputs an allocation with minimum envy. Consider
the following instance: We have two players, 1 and 2 and k+2 goods. In particular we have
good a, good b and k eggs. Let’s say k = 100. The k eggs are playing the role of an almost
divisible good of value 0.2. Suppose the players have the following utilities for the goods:
v1(a) = 0.45, v1(b) = 0.35, v1(egg) = 0.2/k,
v2(a) = 0.35, v2(b) = 0.45, v2(egg) = 0.2/k
The specific instance admits an envy-free allocation: give to player 1 good a and 25 eggs
and give the rest to player 2. Therefore in the allocation that M will output there will be
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no envy. Let A be the partition that M outputs for this instance. Note that in A each
player receives exactly one of the goods a, b because if one player received both then the
other player would envy her. Also we note that it is Player 1 who receives a. To see this,
suppose on the contrary that player 1 receives b. Then in order for A to be envy-free player
1 should receive at least 75 eggs (otherwise the bundle S of player 1 is worth less than 1/2
and she will be envious). But then player 2 will receive a and at most 25 eggs so she will
be envious, a contradiction. Therefore in A player 1 receives a and T eggs and player 2
receives b and k − T eggs. It is also easy to see that 25 ≤ T ≤ 75.
Case 1: T < 74
In this case player 1 can increase her utility by lying and declaring that good a has less
value for her. It is possible for her to lie in such a way to force the mechanism to give her
the good a and at least T + 1 eggs (assuming that 2 does not change her declaration). She
can declare that her valuation function is: v1(a) = 0.45−δ, v1(b) = 0.35+δ, v1(egg) = 0.2/k
where δ is such that:
0.45− δ + (T + 1)0.2/k = 1/2
Notice that under this new declaration, there still exists an envy-free outcome. Let A′ be
the new output of M. Again player 1 will receive a. This is true because if player 1 receives
b then she has to receive at least k − T − 1 eggs so that she is not jealous. But then player
2 will receive good a and at most T + 1 ≤ 74 eggs which in total is worth less than 1/2.
Hence player 1 will get a and at least T + 1 eggs (otherwise her bundle is worth less than
1/2) which is more than what she gets if she is honest.
Case 2: T ≥ 74
Now it is player 2 who can try to cheat. By misreporting her utilities in a similar manner
as in Case 1, she can obtain a higher utility than before. 2
In the rest of the section, we present a simple truthful mechanism which allocates the
goods to the players uniformly at random. We assume that the sum of the utilities of each
player over all goods is one. We will show that with high probability the maximum envy of




Theorem 11 Suppose that vp,j ≤ α ∀p ∈ N, j ∈ M . Then for every ε > 0, and for large
enough n, there exists a truthful algorithm such that with high probability the allocation
output by the algorithm has maximum envy at most O(
√
α n1/2+ε).
Proof : The proof is based on the probabilistic method. Allocate each good indepen-
dently to player p with probability 1/n. Clearly this is a truthful mechanism. We will
show that with high probability, the allocation produced satisfies the desired bound. Fix
two players p, q. Given p and q we define a random variable Yj indicating the contribution
of good j to the envy of player p for q. The variable Yj is equal to 1, if good j is allo-
cated to player q, -1, if it is allocated to player p, and 0 otherwise. Hence: Yj = 1 with
probability 1/n, −1 w.p. 1/n and 0 w.p. (n − 2)/n. We now define the random variable:
fpq =
∑
j vp,jYj . Clearly the envy of p for q is epq = max{0, fpq}. We will show that with
high probability, for every p, q, fpq ≤ O(
√
α n1/2+ε) and this will complete the proof.
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By using Chebyshev’s inequality, we have that for any ordered pair of players p, q such that
p 6= q and for t > 0:
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If we set t = 2
√
α n1/2+ε we have that:
Pr[max. envy < 2
√




Our algorithm for minimizing the envy-ratio works only if the utility functions of the players
are additive and identical. It would be very interesting to find an approximation algorithm
for the general case. One approach is to use a linear programming relaxation similar to
Lenstra et al. [65].
There are many related notions of fairness such as max-min fairness or proportional
fairness and we would like to know the complexity of these solution concepts as well. Some
progress along these lines has already been made in [11].
Another question concerns the tradeoff between fairness and optimality of a solution.
An allocation is optimal if it maximizes the sum of the utilities of the players. Such a





A large volume of transactions is nowadays conducted via auctions, including auction ser-
vices on the internet (e.g., eBay) as well as FCC auctions of spectrum licences. Recently,
there has been a lot of interest in auctions with complex bidding and allocation possibilities
that can capture various dependencies between a large number of items being sold. A very
general model which can express such complex scenarios is that of combinatorial auctions.
In a combinatorial auction, a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players. A utility
function is associated with each player specifying the happiness of the player for each subset
of the goods. One natural objective for the auctioneer is to maximize the economic efficiency
of the auction, which is the sum of the utilities of all the players. Formally, the allocation
problem is defined as follows: We have a set M of m indivisible goods and n players. Player
i has a monotone utility function vi : 2M → R. We wish to find a partition (S1, . . . , Sn)
of the set of goods among the n players that maximizes the total utility or social welfare,∑
i vi(Si). Such an allocation is called an optimal allocation.
We are interested in the computational complexity of the allocation problem, and we
would like an algorithm which runs in time polynomial in n and m. However, one can see
that the input representation is itself exponential in m for general utility functions. Even if
the utility functions have a succinct representation (polynomial in n and m), the allocation
problem may be NP-hard [60, 4]. In the absence of a succinct representation, it is typically
assumed that the auctioneer has oracle access to the players’ utilities and that he can ask
queries to the players. There are 2 types of queries that have been considered. In a value
query the auctioneer specifies a subset S ⊆ M and asks player i for the value vi(S). In a
demand query, the auctioneer presents a set of prices for the goods and asks a player for
the set S of goods that maximizes his profit (which is his utility for S minus the sum of
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the prices of the goods in S). Note that if we have a succinct representation of the utility
functions then we can always simulate value queries. The problem remains hard in the query
model and we are therefore interested in approximation algorithms and inapproximability
results.
A natural class of utility functions that has been studied extensively in the literature is
the class of submodular functions. A function v is submodular if for any 2 sets of goods
S ⊆ T , the marginal contribution of a good x 6∈ T , is bigger when added to S than when
added to T , i.e., v(S ∪ x) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ x) − v(T ). Submodularity can be seen as the
discrete analog of concavity and arises naturally in economic settings since it captures the
property that marginal utilities are decreasing as we allocate more goods to a player. It is
known that the class of submodular utility functions contains the functions with the Gross
Substitutes property [42], and also that submodular functions are complement-free.
3.1.1 Previous Work
For general utility functions, the allocation problem is NP-hard. Approximation algo-
rithms have been obtained that achieve factors of O( 1√
m




m ) ([46], using value queries). It has also been shown that we cannot have
polynomial time algorithms with a factor better than O( log mm ) ([12], using value queries)
or better than O( 1
m1/2−ε
) ([61, 91], even for single minded bidders). If we allow demand
queries, exponential communication is still required to achieve any approximation guarantee
better than O( 1
m1/2−ε
) [77]. For single-minded bidders, as well as for other classes of utility
functions, approximation algorithms have been obtained, among others, in [5, 7, 61]. For
more results on the allocation problem with general utilities, see [20].
For the class of submodular utility functions, the allocation problem is still NP-hard.
The following positive results are known: In [60] it was shown that a simple greedy algorithm
using value queries achieves an approximation ratio of 1/2. An improved ratio of 1−1/e was
obtained in [4] for a special case of submodular functions, the class of additive valuations
with budget constraints. Very recently, approximation algorithms with ratio 1 − 1/e were
obtained in [30, 31] using demand queries. As for negative results, it was shown in [77]
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that an exponential amount of communication is needed to achieve an approximation ratio
better than 1 − O( 1m). In [30] it was shown that there cannot be any polynomial time
algorithm in the succinct representation or the value query model with a ratio better than
50/51, unless P= NP.
3.1.2 Our Result
We show that there is no polynomial time approximation algorithm for the allocation prob-
lem with monotone submodular utility functions achieving a ratio better than 1−1/e, unless
P= NP. Our result is true in the succinct representation model, and hence also in the value
query model. The result does not hold if the algorithm is allowed to use demand queries.
A hardness result of 1 − 1/e for the class XOS (which strictly contains the class of
submodular functions) is obtained in [30] by a gadget reduction from the maximum k-
coverage problem. For a definition of the class XOS, see [60]. Similar reductions do not
seem to work for submodular functions. Instead we provide a reduction from multi-prover
proof systems for MAX-3-COLORING. Our result is based on the reduction of Feige [33]
for the hardness of set-cover and maximum k-coverage. The results of [33] use a reduction
from a multi-prover proof system for MAX-3-SAT. This is not sufficient to give a hardness
result for the allocation problem, as explained in Section 3.3. Instead, we use a proof system
for MAX-3-COLORING. We then define an instance of the allocation problem and show
that the new proof system enables all players to achieve maximum possible utility in the
yes case, and ensure that in the no case, players achieve only a (1 − 1/e)-fraction of the
maximum utility on the average. The crucial property of the new proof system is that when
a graph is 3-colorable, there are in fact many different proofs, i.e., colorings, that make the
verifier accept. This would not be true if we start with a proof system for MAX-3-SAT. By
introducing a correspondence between colorings and players of the allocation instance, we
obtain the desired result.
The current state of the art for the allocation problem with submodular utilities, in-
cluding our result, is summarized in Table 1. We note that we do not address the question
of obtaining truthful mechanisms for the allocation problem. For some classes of functions,
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Table 1: Approximability results for submodular utilities
Algorithms Hardness
Value Queries 1/2 [60] 1− 1/e
Demand Queries 1− 1/e [31] 1−O(1/m) [77]
incentive compatible mechanisms have been obtained that also achieve reasonable approxi-
mations to the allocation problem (e.g. [61, 5, 7]). For submodular utilities, the only truthful
mechanism known is obtained in [30]. This achieves an O( 1√
m
)-approximation. Obtaining a
truthful mechanism with a better approximation guarantee seems to be a challenging open
problem.
In the next section we define the model formally and introduce some notation. In
Section 3.3 we present a weaker hardness result of 3/4 using a 2-prover proof system to
illustrate the ideas in our proof. In Section 3.4 we present the hardness of 1− 1/e based on
the k-prover proof system of [33].
3.2 The Model
We assume we have a set of players N = {1, ..., n} and a set of goods M = {1, ...,m} to
be allocated to the players. Each player has a utility function vi, where for a set S ⊆ M ,
vi(S) is the utility that player i derives if he obtains the set S. We make the standard
assumptions that vi is monotone and that vi(∅) = 0.
Definition 1 A function v : 2M → R is submodular if for any sets S ⊂ T and any
x ∈M\T :
v(S ∪ {x})− v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {x})− v(T )
An equivalent definition of submodular functions is that for any sets S, T : v(S ∪ T ) +
v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
An allocation of M is a partition of the goods (S1, ..., Sn) such that
⋃
i Si = M and
Si ∩ Sj = ∅. The allocation problem we will consider is:
The allocation problem with submodular utilities: Given a monotone,
submodular utility function vi for every player i, find an allocation of the goods
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(S1, ..., Sn) that maximizes
∑
i vi(Si).
To clarify how the input is accessed, we assume that either the utility functions have a
succinct representation1, or that the auctioneer can ask value queries to the players. In a
value query, the auctioneer specifies a subset S to a player i and the player responds with
vi(S). In this case the auctioneer is allowed to ask at most a polynomial number of value
queries.
3.3 A Hardness of 3/4
We first present a hardness result of 3/4. The reduction of this section is based on a 2-prover
proof system for MAX-3-COLORING, which is analogous to the proof system of [69] for
MAX-3-SAT. We remark that this proof is provided here only to illustrate the main ideas
of our result and to give some intuition. In the next Section we will see that by moving to
a k-prover proof system we can obtain a hardness of 1− 1/e.
In the MAX-3-COLORING problem, we are given a graph G and we are asked to color
the vertices of G with 3 different colors so as to maximize the number of properly colored
edges, where an edge is properly colored if its vertices receive different colors. Given a graph
G, let OPT (G) denote the maximum fraction of edges that can be properly colored by any
3-coloring of the vertices. We will start with a gap version of MAX-3-COLORING: Given
a constant c, we denote by GAP-MAX-3-COLORING(c) the promise problem in which
the yes instances are the graphs with OPT (G) = 1 and the no instances are graphs with
OPT (G) ≤ c. By the PCP theorem [6], and by [80], we know:
Proposition 12 There is a constant c < 1 such that GAP-MAX-3-COLORING(c) is NP-
hard, i.e., it is NP-hard to distinguish whether
YES Case: OPT (G) = 1, and
NO Case: OPT (G) ≤ c.
Let G be an instance of GAP-MAX-3-COLORING(c). The first step in our proof is a
1By this we mean a representation of size polynomial in n and m, such that given S and i, the auctioneer
can compute vi(S) in time polynomial in the size of the representation. For example, additive valuations
with budget limits [60] have a succinct representation.
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reduction to the Label Cover problem. A label cover instance L consists of a graph G′, a set
of labels Λ and a binary relation πe ⊆ Λ× Λ for every edge e. The relation πe can be seen
as a constraint on the labels of the vertices of e. An assignment of one label to each vertex
is called a labeling. Given a labeling, we will say that the constraint of an edge e = (u, v) is
satisfied if (l(u), l(v)) ∈ πe, where l(u), l(v) are the labels of u, v respectively. The goal is to
find a labeling of the vertices that satisfies the maximum fraction of edges of G′, denoted
by OPT (L).
The instance L produced from G is the following: G′ has one vertex for every edge (u, v)
of G. The vertices (u1, v1) and (u2, v2) of G′ are adjacent if and only if the edges (u1, v1) and
(u2, v2) have one common vertex in G. Each vertex (u, v) of G′ has 6 labels corresponding
to the 6 different proper colorings of (u, v) using 3 colors. For an edge between (u1, v1) and
(u2, v2) in G′, the corresponding constraint is satisfied if the labels of (u1, v1) and (u2, v2)
assign the same color to their common vertex. From Proposition 12 it follows easily that:
Proposition 13 It is NP-hard to distinguish between:
YES Case: OPT (L) = 1, and
NO Case: OPT (L) ≤ c′, for some constant c′ < 1
We will say that 2 labelings L1, L2 are disjoint if every vertex of G′ receives a different
label in L1 and L2. Note that in the YES case, there are in fact 6 disjoint labelings that
satisfy all the constraints.
The Label Cover instance L is essentially a description of a 2-prover 1-round proof
system for MAX-3-COLORING with completeness parameter equal to 1 and soundness
parameter equal to c′ (see [33, 69] for more on these proof systems).
Given L, we will now define a new label cover instance L′, the hardness of which will
imply hardness of the allocation problem. Going from instance L to L′ is equivalent to
applying the parallel repetition theorem of Raz [85] to the 2-prover proof system for MAX-
3-COLORING.
We will denote by H the graph in the new label cover instance L′. A vertex of H is now
an ordered tuple of s vertices of G′, i.e., it is an ordered tuple of s edges of G, where s is a
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constant to be determined later . We will refer to the vertices of H as nodes to distinguish
them from the vertices of G. For 2 nodes of H, u = (e1, ..., es) and v = (e′1, ..., e
′
s), there is
an edge between u and v if and only if for every i ∈ [s], the edges ei and e′i have exactly
one common vertex (where [s] = {1, ..., s}). We will refer to these s common vertices as
the shared vertices of u and v. The set of labels of a node v = (e1, ..., es) is the set of 6s
proper colorings of its edges (Λ = [6s]). The constraints can be defined analogously to the
constraints in L. In particular, for an edge e = (u, v) of H, a labeling satisfies the constraint
of edge e if the labels of u and v induce the same coloring of their shared vertices.
By Proposition 13 and Raz’s parallel repetition theorem [85], we can show that:
Proposition 14 It is NP-hard to distinguish between:
YES Case: OPT (L′) = 1, and
NO Case: OPT (L′) ≤ 2−γs, for some constant γ > 0.
Remark 1 In fact, in the YES case, there are 6s disjoint labelings that satisfy all the
constraints.
This property will be used crucially in the remaining section. The known reductions from
GAP-MAX-3-SAT to label cover, implicit in [33, 69], are not sufficient to guarantee that
there is more than one labeling satisfying all the edges. This was our motivation for using
GAP-MAX-3-COLORING instead.
The final step of the proof is to define an instance of the allocation problem from L′.
For that we need the following definition:
Definition 2 A Partition System P (U, r, h, t) consists of a universe U of r elements, and
t pairs of sets (A1, Ā1), ...(At, Āt), (Ai ⊂ U) with the property that any collection of h′ ≤ h
sets without a complementary pair Ai, Āi covers at most (1− 1/2h
′
)r elements.
If U = {0, 1}t, we can construct a partition system P (U, r, h, t) with r = 2h and h = t.
For i = 1, ..., t the pair (Ai, Āi) will be the partition of U according to the value of each
element in the i-th coordinate. In this case the sets Ai, Āi have cardinality r/2.
28
For every edge e in the label cover instance L′, we construct a partition system P e(U e, r,








Recall that for every edge e = (u, v), there are 3s different colorings of the s shared
vertices of u and v. Assuming some arbitrary ordering of these colorings, we will say that
the pair (Aei , Ā
e
i ) of P
e corresponds to the ith coloring of the shared vertices.
We define a set system on the whole universe
⋃
U e. For every node v and every label i,
we have a set Sv,i. For every edge e incident on v, Sv,i contains one set from every partition
system P e, as follows. Consider an edge e = (v, w). Then Aej contributes to all the sets Sv,i
such that label i in node v induces the jth coloring of the shared vertices between v and w.
Similarly Āej contributes to all the Sw,i such that label i in node w gives the jth coloring
to the shared vertices (the choice of assigning Aej to the Sv,i’s and Ā
e
j to the Sw,i’s is made







where E is the set of edges of H, B(v,w)j is one of A
(v,w)
j or Āj
(v,w), and j is the coloring
that label i gives to the shared vertices of (v, w).
We are now ready to define our instance I of the allocation problem. There are n = 6s
players, all having the same utility function. The goods are the sets Sv,i for each node v





It is easy to verify that this is a monotone and submodular utility function. Let OPT (I)
be the optimal solution to the instance I.
Lemma 15 If OPT (L′) = 1, then OPT (I) = nr|E|.
Proof : From Remark 1, there are n = 6s disjoint labelings that satisfy all the constraints
of L′. Consider the ith such labeling. This defines an allocation to the ith player as follows:
we allocate the goods Sv,l(v) for each node v, to player i, where l(v) is the label of v in this
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ith labeling. Since the labeling satisfies all the edges, the corresponding sets Sv,l(v) cover
all the subuniverses. To see this, fix an edge e = (v, w). The labeling satisfies e, hence
the labels of v and w induce the same coloring of the shared vertices between v and w,




covered by the sets Sv,l(v) and Sw,l(w) and the utility of player i is r|E|. We can find such
an allocation for every player, since the labelings are disjoint. 2
For the No case, consider the following simple allocation: each player gets exactly one
set from every node. Hence each player i defines a labeling, which cannot satisfy more
than 2−γs fraction of the edges. For the rest of the edges, the 2 sets of player i come from
different partitions and hence can cover at most 3/4 of the subuniverse. This shows that
the total utility of this simple allocation is at most 3/4 of that in the Yes case. In fact, we
will show that this is true for any allocation.
Lemma 16 If OPT (L′) ≤ 2−γs, then OPT (I) ≤ (3/4 + ε)nr|E|, for some small constant
ε > 0 that depends on s.
Proof : Consider an allocation of goods to the players. If player i receives sets S1, ..., Sl,
then his utility pi can be decomposed as pi =
∑
e pi,e, where
pi,e = |(∪jSj) ∩ U e|
Fix an edge (u, v). Let mi be the number of goods of the type Su,j for some j. Let m′i
be the number of goods of the type Sv,j for some j, and let xi = mi + m′i. Let N be the
set of players. For the edge e = (u, v), let N e1 be the set of players whose sets cover the
subuniverse U e and N e2 = N\N e1 . Let ne1 = |N e1 | and ne2 = |N e2 |. Note that for i ∈ N e1 , the
contribution of the xi sets to pi,e is r. For i ∈ N e2 , it follows that the contribution of the
xi sets to pi,e is at most (1− 12xi )r by the properties of the partition system of this edge
2.
2To use the property of P e, we need to ensure that xi ≤ 3s. However since i ∈ Ne2 , even if xi > 3s, the
distinct sets Aej or Ā
e
j that he has received through his xi goods are all from different partitions of Ue and
hence they can be at most 3s.
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In the YES case, the total utility derived from the subuniverse U e was nr. Hence the
loss in the total utility derived from U e is











By the convexity of the function 2−x, we have that









xi ≥ 2ne1, since players in N e1 cover U e and they need at least 2 sets
to do this. Therefore
∑
i∈Ne2















For an edge (u, v), let N e,≤s1 be the set of players from N
e
1 who have at most s goods of





















where the inequality follows from the fact that for the edge e we cannot have more than





1 | < δn|E|, where δ ≤ c′s2−γs, for some constant c′.
Proof : Suppose that the sum is δn|E| for some δ ≤ 1. Then it can be easily seen that
for at least δ|E|/2 edges, |N e,≤s1 | ≥ δn/2. Call these edges good edges.
Pick a player i at random. For every node, consider the set of goods assigned to player
i from this node, and pick one at random. Assign the corresponding label to this node. If
player i has not been assigned any good from some node, then assign an arbitrary label to
this node. This defines a labeling. We look at the expected number of satisfied edges.
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For every good edge e = (u, v), the probability that e is satisfied is at least δ/2s2, since
e has at least δn/2 players that have covered U e with at most s goods. Since there are
at least δ|E|/2 good edges, the expected number of satisfied edges is at least δ2|E|/4s2.
This means that there exists a labeling that satisfies at least δ2|E|/4s2 edges. But, since
OPT (L′) ≤ 2−γs, we get δ ≤ c′s2−γs, for some constant c′. 2





+ δn|E| ≤ εn|E|






which implies that OPT (I) ≤ (3/4 + ε)nr|E|. 2
Given any ε > 0, we can choose s large enough so that Lemma 16 holds. From Lemmas 15
and 16, we have:
Theorem 18 For any ε > 0, there is no polynomial time (3/4+ε)-approximation algorithm
for the allocation problem with monotone submodular utilities, unless P = NP.
3.4 A Hardness of 1-1/e
In this section we obtain a stronger result by using a k-prover proof system (i.e., a label
cover problem on hypergraphs) for MAX-3-COLORING. The new proof system is obtained
in a similar manner as the proof system for MAX-3-SAT by Feige [33].
Let G be an instance of GAP-MAX-3-COLORING(c). From the graph G, we will
define a new label cover instance. The label cover instance is now defined on a hypergraph
H instead of a graph. Let s and k be constants to be determined later. The hypergraph
H consists of k layers of vertices, V1, ..., Vk. To every layer Vi, we associate a binary string
Ci ∈ {0, 1}s of weight s/2, with the property that the Hamming distance between any 2
strings is at least s/3. One can obtain such a collection of strings by using the codewords
of an appropriate binary code (see [33] for more details). Notice that each Ci defines a
partition of the indices {1, ..., s} into 2 sets Ai, Bi, each of cardinality s/2, where an index
l belongs to Ai (resp. Bi) if the l-th bit of Ci is 1 (resp. 0).
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We will refer to the vertices of H as nodes. One difference from Section 3.3 is that now
a node of H will contain both edges and vertices of G. To be more specific, a node v in Vi
is an ordered s-tuple v = (v1, ..., vs), where for l ∈ {1, ..., s}, if l ∈ Ai, then vl is an edge of
G, otherwise it is a vertex of G. Clearly there are at most nO(s) nodes in each layer Vi and
since k and s are constants, the size of H is polynomial in the size of G.
A label of a node v in Vi will be a proper coloring of the s/2 edges corresponding to
v and a coloring of the s/2 vertices corresponding to v. Hence there are 6s/23s/2 distinct
labels. For technical reasons we make 6s/23s/2 copies of each label so that in total we have
6s labels in every node.
Edges of the hypergraph H have cardinality k and contain one node from each layer.
For every ordered tuple of s edges (e1, ..., es), of G and a choice of s vertices (u1, ..., us),
one from each ei, we will have a hyperedge (v1, ..., vk) in H, with vi ∈ Vi if and only if the
nodes v1, ..., vk satisfy the following:
1. vli = el if l ∈ Ai.
2. vli = ul if l ∈ Bi.
We will call the vertices u1, ..., us the shared vertices of the hyperedge (v1, ..., vk). Given a
labeling to the nodes of H, let (l(v1), ..., l(vk)) be the labels of the hyperedge e = (v1, ..., vk).
We will say that e is weakly satisfied if there exists a pair of nodes vi, vj that agree on
the coloring of the shared vertices as induced by their labeling. We will call the pair
of labels (l(vi), l(vj)) a consistent pair with respect to the hyperedge e and the labeling.
We will say that a hyperedge is strongly satisfied if for every pair vi, vj , (l(vi), l(vj)) is
consistent. This completes the description of the label cover instance L. Let OPTweak(L)
(resp. OPT strong(L)) be the maximum fraction of hyperedges that can be weakly (resp.
strongly) satisfied by any labeling. The following lemma is essentially Lemma 5 in [33].
Lemma 19 It is NP-hard to distinguish between:
YES Case: OPT strong(L) = 1
NO Case: OPTweak(L) ≤ k22−γs, for some constant γ > 0.
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Remark 2 In the YES Case of Lemma 19, there are 6s disjoint labelings that strongly
satisfy all the hyperedges.
This follows from a similar argument as for Remark 1.
To define the instance of the allocation problem, we will first construct a set system as
in Section 3.3. For this we will need a more general notion of a partition system:
Lemma 20 ([33]) Let U = [k]n. We can construct a partition system on U of the form
P = {(A11, ..., A1k), (A21, ..., A2k), ..., (An1 , ..., Ank)}, with the properties that
1. For i = 1, ..., n, ∪Aij = U .
2. Any collection of l ≤ n sets, one from each partition, covers exactly (1−(1−1/k)l)|U |
elements.
For every hyperedge e, we will have a separate subuniverse U e. Let n = 6s be the number
of labels of each node. For each hyperedge e we construct a partition system P e on the sub-
universe U e as in Lemma 20. Let P e = {(Ae1,1, ..., Ae1,k), (Ae2,1, ..., Ae2,k), ..., (Aen,1, ..., Aen,k)}.
Notice that for a hyperedge e = (v1, ..., vk), we can always find n disjoint labelings of the
nodes v1, ..., vk that strongly satisfy the hyperedge e. This follows from the fact that there
are 6s proper colorings of an s-tuple of edges of G and for each such coloring we can pick
a label from each node vi that respects this coloring. Due to the multiple copies of each
distinct label, we in fact have more than n labelings that strongly satisfy e. We arbitrarily
pick n of these disjoint labelings (note that any other labeling that strongly satisfies e is
”isomorphic” to one of the n labelings picked). Assuming some arbitrary ordering among
the n labelings, we associate the jth partition of P e with the jth labeling of e, for every e.
If (lj1, ..., l
j




j,k) is the jth partition of P
e we will also
say that the set Aej,i corresponds to the label l
j
i of vi.
We can now define our set system. We will have one set Sv,i for every node v and label
i. Let v ∈ Vl for some l ∈ [k]. For an edge e that contains node v, suppose label i is in the
jth labeling of e. We will then include the set Aej,l from the jth partition in Sv,i. Hence
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where je(i) is the labeling of edge e that contains i.
As in Section 3.3, the instance of the allocation problem contains n = 6s players with
the same submodular utility function. The goods are the sets Sv,i and the utility of a player
for a collection of sets is the cardinality of their union. Let I denote the instance of the
allocation problem and let OPT (I) be the optimal solution of I. Let r = |U e| and let E
be the set of the hyperedges of H. Our hardness result is established by the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 21 If OPT strong(L) = 1, then OPT (I) = nr|E|.
Proof : Since OPT strong(L) = 1, consider a labeling that strongly satisfies all the
hyperedges. By the discussion above, we can always pick a labeling such that when restricted
to the nodes of an edge, it corresponds to one of the n disjoint labelings of that edge. Let
l(v) be the label of each node. Pick a player and allocate to him all the sets {Sv,l(v)}. We
claim that the sets cover the subuniverse U e for every edge e and the utility of the player
is therefore r|E|. To see this, fix an edge e = (v1, ..., vk). Since the labeling strongly satifies
the edge, it corresponds to some partition of the partition system P e, say the jth partition.
Hence for i = 1, ..., k, the set Aej,i which corresponds to label l(vi) is contained in Svi,l(vi).
Thus the player covers the entire subuniverse U e with the sets Svi,l(vi). Since this is true
for every edge, his utility is exactly r|E|. By Remark 2 we can repeat the above for all the
6s players. 2
Lemma 22 If OPTweak(L) ≤ k22−γs, then OPT (I) ≤ (1 − 1/e + ε)nr|E|, where ε > 0 is
some small constant depending on s and k.
Proof : Consider an allocation of the goods to the players, i.e., an allocation of the labels
of each node. We decompose the utility pi of player i as: pi =
∑
pi,e, where pi,e is as in
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Section 3.3. For a node v and a player i, let mvi be the number of sets of the type Sv,j that




i . Define the set of
players:
N e1 = {i : ∃vj , vl such that i has a pair of consistent labels for these 2 nodes}
Let N e2 = N\N e1 , and let ne1 = |N e1 |, ne2 = |N e2 |. Trivially, for i ∈ N e1 , the contribution of the
xei sets to pi,e is at most r. For i ∈ N e2 , the xei sets of the type Svl,j do not contain even one
pair of labels which are consistent for some pair of nodes in e. For each set Svl,j that player
i has received, let Aet,l be the set from the partition system P
e contained in Svl,j . It follows
that the sets Aet,l corresponding to the labels of player i come from different partitions of
U e. Therefore, by Lemma 20, we get that the sets Svl,j cover exactly 1− (1− 1k )
xei fraction
of the subuniverse U e. Hence the total utility derived by the players from the subuniverse













The loss in the total utility compared to the YES case is:
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By the convexity of the function (1− 1k )











1 be the set of players from N
e
1 who have at most k


























where the inequality follows from the fact that for the edge e we cannot have more than





1 | < δn|E|, for δ ≤ ck32−γs, for some constant c.
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Proof : The proof is similar to that of Claim 6. If we assume the contrary to the
statement then we can find a labeling which weakly satisfies more than k22−γs fraction of











2 ≥ (1−β)n|E|, for some small constant




2ne2. Here a similar argument would need that
∑
i∈Ne2
xei ≤ kne2, which may not be true for









1 ≤ βn|E|, it follows that for at least a 1 −
√
β fraction of the edges, ne2 ≥
(1−
√








≤ k(1 + β′)
for some small constant β′ > 0. From (2), we get that for every good edge the loss ∆e ≥
rne2(1− 1k )
k(1+β′) ≥ rne2(1− β′′)1e , for some small constant β
′′ > 0. Summing the loss over











β)2(1− β′′) ≥ 1
e
nr|E|(1− ε)
where ε > 0 is some small constant. Hence the total utility is at most (1− 1e + ε)nr|E| 2
Given any ε > 0, we can choose large enough constants s, k so that Lemma 22 holds.
Hence we get:
Theorem 24 For any ε > 0, there is no polynomial time (1− 1e+ε)-approximation algorithm
for the allocation problem with monotone submodular utilities, unless P=NP.
3.5 Conclusion
We have provided a (1− 1/e ' 0.632)-hardness of approximation in the value query model.
There is a gap between the upper and lower bounds in both the value query and demand
query model. It would be interesting to narrow these gaps. It will also be interesting to
obtain truthful mechanisms with good approximation guarantees.
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CHAPTER IV
EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS IN GAMES
4.1 Introduction
Noncooperative game theory has been extensively used for modeling and analyzing situa-
tions of strategic interactions. One of the dominant solution concepts in noncooperative
games is that of a Nash equilibrium [73]. Briefly, a Nash equilibrium of a game is a situation
in which no agent has an incentive to deviate from her current strategy. A nice property of
this concept is the well known fact that every game has at least one such equilibrium [73].
We consider the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in finite games. The proof
given by Nash for the existence of equilibria is based on Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and
is nonconstructive. Even for 2-player games there is still no polynomial time algorithm.
The running time of all known algorithms (see among others [55, 57, 59, 62, 63]) is either
exponential (in the number of available pure strategies) or has not been determined yet (and
is believed to be exponential). For m-person games, m > 2, the problem seems to be even
more difficult. While for 2-player games it can be formalized as a Linear Complementarity
Problem (and hence some of the algorithms above) the problem for 3-player games is a Non-
linear Complementarity Problem. Algorithms for equilibria in multi-player games (among
others, [88, 105]) are also believed to be exponential. Recently it has been shown that finding
equilibria with certain natural properties (e.g. maximizing payoff) is NP-hard [19, 38]. The
complexity of finding a single equilibrium has been of considerable interest in the computer
science community and has been addressed as one of the current challenges in computational
complexity [82]. In fact it is known that the problem for 2-person games lies in some class
between FP and FNP [81] (the search versions of P and NP). For a summary of results
on algorithms for Nash equilibria see the surveys [104, 71].
An issue related to the complexity of the problem is that even for 3-player games, there
exist examples [73] in which the payoff data are rational numbers but all the Nash equilibria
38
have irrational entries. Hence it is not even clear whether an equilibrium can be finitely
represented on a Turing machine. This problem does not exist in 2-player games, in which
it is known that there is always an equilibrium that can be described by polynomially sized
rational numbers.
A second and related issue is the need to play simple strategies. Even if Nash strategies
can be computed efficiently, they may be too complicated to implement. This has been
pointed out, among others, by Simon [97] and later by Rubinstein [90] in the context
of bounded rationality. Players tend to prefer a sub-optimal strategy (with respect to
rationality) instead of following a complex plan of action. In this chapter, we consider
normal form games and we will call a strategy simple if it is a uniform distribution on
a small support (multi)set. The importance of small support strategies becomes clear if
we consider the pure strategies to be resources. In this case an equilibrium is almost
impractical if a player has to use a mixed strategy which randomizes over a large set of
resources. However, there exist games whose Nash equilibria are completely mixed, i.e., a
player has to randomize over all his available pure strategies.
4.1.1 Our Results
We address the above issues (namely, the need for efficient algorithms and the need for
simple strategies), by using the weaker concept of ε-equilibrium (strategies from which
each player has only an ε incentive to defect). In particular, we propose two algorithms
for computing approximate equilibria both of which improve the previously known upper
bounds on the complexity of the problem.
In Section 4.2.1 we show that for any 2-person game, there exists an ε-equilibrium with
only logarithmic support (in the number of available pure strategies). Moreover the strategy
of each player in such an equilibrium is uniform on its support set and can be expressed
in polylogarithmically many bits. In our opinion, this is an interesting observation on the
structure of competitive behavior in various scenarios - namely, extremely simple approxi-
mate solutions exist. Our proof is based on the probabilistic method and it directly yields
a quasi-polynomial (nO(ln n), where n is the number of available pure strategies) algorithm
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for computing such an approximate equilibrium. To our knowledge this is the first subex-
ponential algorithm for ε-equilibria. In addition to having small support, our approximate
equilibria provide both players with a good payoff too: the payoff that each player receives
using these strategies is almost the same as that in some exact Nash equilibrium. Finally,
our result can be easily generalized to multi-player games and our algorithm remains subex-
ponential as long as the number of players is constant. It is interesting to note that although
the problem of finding exact equilibria is believed to become more difficult in the “tran-
sition” from 2-player to 3-player games (due to the nonlinearity of the complementarity
problem), this is not the case for approximate equilibria.
A second result (Section 4.2.2) is that if the players are allowed to communicate and
“sign treaties” then there are constant support strategies which approximate the payoffs
that each player gets in an equilibrium (in fact there are constant support strategies that
approximate the payoffs of any pair of strategies). In real life, such treaties are not unknown
(though often tacit) - this result can be considered as an explanation of why certain small
strategies behave well and are used in real games, as opposed to a large and complicated
Nash equilibrium.
In Section 4.2.3 we investigate the question: when does a game have small support exact
Nash equilibria? We give a sufficient condition for 2-person games: if the payoff matrices
of the players have low rank then there exists a Nash equilibrium with small support. Our
proof is based on Caratheodory’s theorem and the result has some interesting corollaries
regarding the computation of Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that if the matrices can
be well approximated by low rank matrices, then there exists an approximate equilibrium
with small support. It also follows that if the payoff matrices have constant rank, we can
compute an exact Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
In Section 4.3, we take an algebraic approach by using the observation that Nash equi-
libria are essentially the roots of a single polynomial equation. Based on this, we first show
that every game has at least one Nash equilibrium for which all the entries in the proba-
bility distributions are algebraic numbers and hence can be finitely represented. A finite
representation has been known for 2-player games but nothing was known for games with
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three or more players. The current bounds for the size of the representation are exponential.
We also use results from the existential theory of reals and propose a second algorithm for
computing an approximate equilibrium, which runs in time poly(log 1/ε, L,mn). Here m
is the number of players, n is the total number of available strategies, ε is the degree of
approximation and L is the maximum bit size of the payoff data. For the case of two players
our algorithm can be modified to compute an exact Nash equilibrium in time 2O(n). This is
yet another exponential algorithm for computing an exact equilibrium in 2-person games.
Finally we address the question of whether the existence of Nash equilibria can have
any additional algebraic implications. We observe that since the set of Nash equilibria is
a nonempty semi-algebraic set, this implies the existence of nontrivial solutions in certain
systems of polynomial inequalities. We believe that this can be a new approach for providing
simple proofs for the existence of solutions in such systems.
4.1.2 Related Work
The problem of looking for small support equilibria has been studied earlier. Koller and
Megiddo [55] prove that for two person games in extensive form there exist equilibrium
strategies whose support is at most the number of leaves of the game tree. However, not
all games can be represented in the extensive form with a small number of leaves (where
by small we mean logarithmic in the number of pure strategies). Our result guarantees the
existence of equilibria with logarithmic support for any two person normal form game (and
also for multiple players as stated above) but the equilibria are only approximate.
For the class of 2-person zero-sum games, results for approximate minmax strategies
have been proved independently by Althöfer [3], Lipton and Young [69], and Newman [75].
In fact the proofs of Section 4.2.1 use the same technique (sampling). Recent algorithms
for exact or approximate equilibria but only for special classes of games have been obtained
among others in [66, 50, 51].
The fact that Nash equilibria are fixed points of a certain map [73] gives rise to many
algorithmic approaches that are based on Scarf’s algorithm [92], which is a general algorithm
for approximating fixed points of continuous mappings. The worst case complexity of this
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algorithm and its variants is exponential in all the parameters, namely the total number
of strategies, the number of players and the digits of accuracy [43]. Our first algorithm
(Section 4.2.1) is subexponential in the number of strategies and exponential in the accuracy
parameter and the number of players. Our second algorithm is polynomial in the digits of
accuracy but exponential in the number of strategies and players. Our second algorithm is
also stronger in the sense that not only players have very small incentive to deviate from the
approximate equilibrium, but also the set of strategies which are output are exponentially
close to some exact Nash equilibrium. This is not ensured neither by our first algorithm
nor by Scarf’s algorithm. More information on algorithmic approaches can be found in the
surveys [71, 104].
The algebraic characterization of Nash equilibria as the set of solutions to a system of
polynomial inequalities has been used before. In [99], algebraic techniques are presented
for counting the number of completely mixed equilibria. In [23] it is shown that every
real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria of some
three-person game. However representation and complexity issues are not addressed there.
A similar approach to ours was developed independently in [83], yielding a polynomial time
algorithm for symmetric games with relatively small number of strategies.
4.2 Small Support ε-equilibria
We start with some definitions and notation for 2-player games. As we will see the results
of Section 4.2.1 generalize to multiple player games. Consider a 2-player game where for
simplicity the number of available (pure) strategies for each player is n. We will refer to the
two players as the row and the column player and we will denote their payoff matrices by
R,C respectively. The meaning of the payoff matrices is that if the row player chooses his
ith pure strategy and the column player chooses his jth pure strategy, then they receive a
payoff of Rij , Cij respectively.
A mixed strategy (or a randomized strategy) for a player is a probability distribution
over the set of his pure strategies and will be represented by a vector x = (x1, x2, ..., xn),
where xi ≥ 0 and
∑
xi = 1. Here xi is the probability that the player will choose his
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ith pure strategy. If xi > 0 we say that the mixed strategy x uses the ith pure strategy.
The support of x (Supp(x)) is the set of pure strategies that it uses. A mixed strategy is
called k-uniform if it is the uniform distribution on a multiset S of pure strategies, with
|S| = k. For a mixed strategy pair x, y, the payoff to the row player is the expected value of
a random variable which is equal to Rij with probability xiyj . Therefore the payoff to the
row player is (x,Ry), where (. , .) denotes the inner product of two n-dimensional vectors.
Similarly the payoff to the column player is (x,Cy).
The notion of a Nash equilibrium [73] is formulated as follows:
Definition 3 A pair of strategies x∗, y∗ form a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
(i) for every (mixed) strategy x̄ of the row player, (x̄, Ry∗) ≤ (x∗, Ry∗),
(ii) for every (mixed) strategy ȳ of the column player, (x∗, Cȳ) ≤ (x∗, Cy∗).
In other words, no player has an incentive to (unilaterally) deviate from his strategy. In
the same manner we can define Nash equilibria for multi-player games, requiring that no
player has an incentive to deviate, given that the other players do not change their strategy.
Similarly we can define ε-equilibria:
Definition 4 For any ε > 0 a pair of mixed strategies x′, y′ is called an ε-Nash equilibrium
if and only if:
(i) for every (mixed) strategy x̄ of the row player, (x̄, Ry′) ≤ (x′, Ry′) + ε,
(ii) for every (mixed) strategy ȳ of the column player, (x′, Cȳ) ≤ (x′, Cy′) + ε.
4.2.1 A Subexponential Algorithm for 2-person Games and Generalizations
For the present we assume that all entries of R and C are between 0 and 1. Our main result
is:
Theorem 25 For any Nash equilibrium x∗, y∗ and for any ε > 0, there exists, for every
k ≥ 12 ln n
ε2
, a pair of k-uniform strategies x′, y′, such that:
1. x′, y′ is an ε-equilibrium,
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2. |(x′, Ry′) − (x∗, Ry∗)| < ε (row player gets almost the same payoff as in the Nash
equilibrium),
3. |(x′, Cy′)− (x∗, Cy∗)| < ε (column player gets almost the same payoff as in the Nash
equilibrium).
Proof :
The proof is based on the probabilistic method. For the given ε > 0, fix k ≥ 12 lnn/ε2.
Form a multiset A by sampling k times from the set of pure strategies of the row player,
independently at random according to the distribution x∗. Similarly form a multiset B by
sampling k times from the pure strategies of the column player, independently at random
according to the distribution y∗.
Let x′ be the mixed strategy for the row player which assigns probability 1/k to each
member of A and 0 to other pure strategies. Let y′ be the mixed strategy for the column
player which assigns probability 1/k to each member of B and 0 to other pure strategies.
Clearly, if a pure strategy occurs α times in the multiset, then it is assigned probability
α/k.
Denote by xi the ith pure strategy of the row player, and by yj the jth pure strategy of
the column player. In order to analyze the probability that x′, y′ is an ε-Nash equilibrium
it suffices to consider only deviations to pure strategies.
We define the following events:
φ1 = {| (x′, Ry′)− (x∗, Ry∗) |< ε/2}
π1,i = {(xi, Ry′) < (x′, Ry′) + ε}, (i = 1, ..., n)
φ2 = {| (x′, Cy′)− (x∗, Cy∗) |< ε/2}
π2,j = {(x′, Cyj) < (x′, Cy′) + ε}, (j = 1, ..., n)







We wish to show that Pr[GOOD] > 0. This would mean that there exists a choice of A
and B such that the corresponding strategies x′ and y′ satisfy all three conditions in the
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statement of the theorem.
In order to bound the probabilities of the events φc1 and φ
c
2 we introduce the following
events:
φ1a = {| (x′, Ry∗)− (x∗, Ry∗) |< ε/4}
φ1b = {| (x′, Ry′)− (x′, Ry∗) |< ε/4}
φ2a = {| (x∗, Cy′)− (x∗, Cy∗) |< ε/4}
φ2b = {| (x′, Cy′)− (x∗, Cy′) |< ε/4}
Note that φ1a∩φ1b ⊆ φ1. The expression (x′, Ry∗) is essentially a sum of k independent
random variables each of expected value (x∗, Ry∗). Each such random variable takes value
between 0 and 1. Therefore we can apply a standard tail inequality [45] and get:
Pr[φc1a] ≤ 2e−kε
2/8
Using a similar argument we have:
Pr[φc1b] ≤ 2e−kε
2/8
Therefore Pr[φc1] ≤ 4e−kε
2/8 and the same holds for the event φc2.
In order to bound the probabilities of the events π1,i’s and π2,j ’s we define the following
auxilliary events:
ψ1,i = {(xi, Ry′) < (xi, Ry∗) + ε/2}, (i = 1, ..., n)
ψ2,j = {(x′, Ryj) < (x∗, Ryj) + ε/2}, (j = 1, ..., n)
We can easily see that
ψ1,i ∩ φ1 ⊆ π1,i, (i = 1, ..., n)
ψ2,j ∩ φ2 ⊆ π2,j , (j = 1, ..., n)




Pr[ψc2,j ] ≤ e−kε
2/2
Now by combining the above equations we see that:







≤ 8e−kε2/8 + 2n[e−kε2/2 + 4e−kε2/8] < 1
Thus Pr[GOOD] > 0. 2
Note that not only do the strategies x′, y′ form an ε-equilibrium, but they also provide
both players with a payoff ε-close to the payoffs they would get in some Nash equilibrium.
In fact, the payoffs of every Nash equilibrium can be thus approximated by a small strategy
ε-equilibrium. Furthermore x′, y′ are k-uniform, which implies the following corollary:
Corollary 26 For a 2-person game, there exists a quasi-polynomial algorithm for comput-
ing all k-uniform ε-equilibria.
Proof : Given an ε > 0, fix k = 12 ln n
ε2
. By an exhaustive search, we can compute
all k-uniform ε-equilibria (by Theorem 25 at least one such equilibrium exists; verifying
ε-equilibrium condition is easy as we need to check only for deviations to pure strategies).






pairs of multisets to look at. 2
To our knowledge this is the first subexponential algorithm for finding an approximate
equilibrium. Furthermore, given the payoffs of any Nash equilibrium the algorithm can find
an ε-Nash equilibrium in which both players receive payoffs ε-close to the given values.
When the entries of R and C are not between 0 and 1 the ε-incentive to defect and the
ε-change in payoff both get magnified by Rmax−Rmin for the row player and by Cmax−Cmin
for the column player. Here Rmax and Rmin denote the maximum and minimum entry of
R, and similarly for C. Additionally if the players do not have the same number of pure
strategies (say n1, n2) then the same result holds with k ≥ 12 ln max{n1,n2}ε2 .
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Our results can also be generalized to games with more than two players. In particular
for an m-person game:
Theorem 27 Let x∗1, ..., x
∗





the payoffs to the players in the Nash equilibrium. Then for any ε > 0, there exists, for
every k ≥ 3m2 ln m2n
ε2
, a set of k-uniform strategies x′1, ..., x
′
m, such that:
1. x′1, ..., x
′
m is an ε-equilibrium,
2. |p′i − p∗i | < ε for i = 1, ...,m
where p′1, ..., p
′
m are the payoffs to the players if they play strategies x
′
i.
The proof of Theorem 27 is completely analogous to that of Theorem 25 and we omit
it. As we see, we can guarantee an ε-equilibrium with logarithmic support only when the
number of players, m, is constant. It seems to us that the technique of sampling cannot help
us prove a more general theorem than that. It is an interesting question to see whether this
can be done using a different technique. However, it is still interesting that we can prove
the existence of simple approximate equilibria even for 3-player games. This is so because
the problem of finding exact equilibria for 3-player games seems to be more difficult than
for 2-player games due to the existence of irrational equilibria and the non-linearity of the
Complementarity Problem.
Corollary 26 also generalizes to games with a constant number of players since in this
case the number of combinations of multisets that the algorithm has to look at is still
quasi-polynomial.
4.2.2 Approximating Payoffs of Nash equilibria with Constant Support
In terms of the size of the support we can do much better, if we have weaker requirements.
There may be applications in which we would not even insist on an approximate equilibrium.
All we would care for is to approximate the payoffs in an actual Nash equilibrium. The
next result is in that direction:
Theorem 28 For any Nash equilibrium x∗, y∗ and any ε > 0, there exists, for every k ≥
5/ε2, a pair of k-uniform strategies (x, y), such that
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1. |(x,Ry)− (x∗, Ry∗)| < ε,
2. |(x,Cy)− (x∗, Cy∗)| < ε.
Again this result can be generalized to multiple player games. For an m-person game
the support of the k-uniform strategies will be O(m2 lnm/ε2).
Theorem 28 establishes the existence of constant support strategies which approximate
the payoffs that both players get in a Nash equilibrium. The techniques used to prove
this are the same as those used to prove Theorem 25, and the proof is omitted. Again,
we assume that the entries of R and C are between 0 and 1 (in the general case we get a
magnification by Rmax −Rmin and Cmax − Cmin as before). Note that Theorem 28 is true
for any pair of strategies x∗, y∗, not necessarily for Nash equilibria.
A situation in which this result could be applicable is the following: Consider a game
between two players both having a very large number of pure strategies at their disposal.
Let v1, v2 be the payoffs in a Nash equilibrium to the row and column player respectively.
If the support of the equilibrium strategies is very big, then it would be preferable for both
players to sign a “bilateral treaty” and use only a small number of strategies, as provided
by the result. In that case, both players would still receive a payoff close to v1 and v2
respectively, while using a small number of strategies. Furthermore, each player will be
able to check, during the game, if the other player has violated the treaty, in which case he
can switch to any other strategy.
4.2.3 A Sufficient Condition for Small Support Exact Equilibria
In this section we investigate the question: when does a 2-person game have small support
exact Nash equilibria? We show that if the payoff matrices have low rank then the game
has a small support Nash equilibrium. Furthermore we show that if the payoff matrices
can be approximated by low rank matrices then the game has a small support approximate
equilibrium (where the approximation factor depends on how well the matrices can be
approximated).
Suppose that the two players have n1 and n2 available pure strategies respectively. Then
the payoff matrices, R, C, are of dimension n1 × n2.
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Theorem 29 Let x∗, y∗ be a Nash equilibrium. If rank(C) ≤ k, then there exists a mixed
strategy x for the row player with |Supp(x)| ≤ k + 1 such that x, y∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, if rank(R) ≤ k, then there exists a mixed strategy y for the column player with
|Supp(y)| ≤ k + 1 such that x∗, y is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore the payoff that both
players receive in the equilibria x, y∗ and x∗, y is equal to the payoff in the initial equilibrium
x∗, y∗.
Our original proof of Theorem 29 was a generalization of a result due to Raghavan [84],
which deals with “completely mixed equilibria”, i.e., equilibria which use all the pure strate-
gies. The generalization was based on a careful Gaussian elimination type step. However,
we now suspect that this theorem may not be unknown to the game theory community as
we recently realized that a simple proof follows from the polyhedral structure of the set of
Nash equilibria (see [104, 48]). We would still like to bring the theorem to the attention of
the broader computer science and economics community as it has some interesting corollar-
ies regarding the computation of Nash equilibria. We present below another simple proof,
based on Caratheodory’s theorem, suggested to us by N. Vishnoi and N. Devanur [29]:
Proof of Theorem 29 : Let S be the k-dimensional space spanned by the columns of
R. Since Ry∗ is a convex combination of the columns of R, it can be written as a convex
combination of at most k + 1 columns of R (by Caratheodory’s Theorem). Let this new
convex combination be Ry. Note that Supp(y) ⊆ Supp(y∗). This implies that y is a best
response to x∗. Since Ry∗ = Ry, x∗ is also a best reponse to y. Hence x∗, y is a Nash
equilibrium. Since Ry∗ = Ry the first player receives the same value in x∗, y as in x∗, y∗.
The second player will also receive the same value as in the initial equilibrium because
Supp(y) ⊆ Supp(y∗). 2
Definition 5 For two matrices C,D, D is an ε-approximation of C if C = D + E, where
|Eij | ≤ ε for every i, j.
Lemma 30 Let D be an ε-approximation of C. Let x∗, y∗ be a Nash equilibrium for the
game with payoff matrices R,D. Then x∗, y∗ is a 2ε-Nash equilibrium for the game with
payoff matrices R,C.
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Proof : Clearly (x∗, Ry∗) ≥ (x̄, Ry∗), ∀ x̄. For any strategy ȳ:
(x∗, Cy∗) = (x∗, Dy∗) + (x∗, Ey∗) ≥ (x∗, Dȳ) + (x∗, Ey∗)
Since |Eij | ≤ ε, ∀ i, j,
(x∗, Eȳ)− (x∗, Ey∗) ≤ 2ε
Hence,
(x∗, Cy∗) ≥ (x∗, Dȳ) + (x∗, Eȳ)− 2ε = (x∗, Cȳ)− 2ε
2
Corollary 31 For any game R,C, and for any k < min{n1, n2}, if C can be ε-approximated
by a rank k matrix, then there exists a 2ε-equilibrium x, y with |Supp(x)| ≤ k+1. Similarly
for R.
In particular, we can use the Singular Value Decomposition to approximate the payoff
matrices R,C by rank k matrices for any k. The approximation factor ε of Corollary 31 is
then a function of the singular values of the matrices.
A useful corollary arises from the observation that for 2-person games, if we know the
support of a Nash equilibrium, then we can compute the exact equilibrium strategies in
polynomial time. This is because an equilibrium strategy y for the column player equalizes
the payoff that the row player gets for every pure strategy in his support and vice versa.
Hence we can write a linear program and compute the Nash equilibrium with the given
support. The following is a direct consequence of this observation and Theorem 29.
Corollary 32 If the payoff matrices R,C have constant rank, then we can compute an
exact Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. In particular if one of the players has a constant
number of pure strategies, we can compute a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
4.3 An Algebraic Approach
In this Section, we will mainly be interested in multi-player games. We start with the
observation that the set of Nash equilibria of an m-player game is the set of solutions to a
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system of polynomial inequalities. For this we need to introduce some additional notation.
Consider a game with m players and suppose that the number of available pure strategies
for player i is ni. Let n0 = maxni. We will denote the m-dimensional payoff matrix of
player i by Ai. If players 1, · · · ,m play the pure strategies j1, · · · , jm respectively, player
i receives a payoff equal to Ai(j1, · · · , jm). We assume that the entries of the matrices are
integers, at most L bits long and H = 2L is their maximum absolute value.
A mixed strategy for player i will be represented by a vector xi = (xi1, xi2, · · · , xi,ni),
where xij ≥ 0 and
∑
xij = 1. We denote by Si the strategy space of player i, i.e., the
(ni − 1)-dimensional unit simplex. For an m-tuple of mixed strategies x = (x1, · · · , xm) ∈







Ai(j1, · · · , jm)x1,j1 · · ·xm,jm (3)
For a tuple of mixed strategies x = (x1, · · · , xm), we will denote by x−i the set of strate-
gies: {xj : j 6= i}. We will also denote by (x−i, x′i) the tuple (x1, · · · , xi−1, x′i, xi+1, · · · , xm),
i.e., the ith player switches to the strategy x′i while all other players keep playing the same
strategy as in x. Under this notation, a Nash equilibrium is formulated as follows:
Definition 6 A tuple of strategies x = (x1, · · · , xm) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sm is a Nash equilibrium
if for every player i and for every mixed strategy x′i ∈ Si, P i(x−i, x′i) ≤ P i(x).
As we have already seen in the proof of Theorem 25, it is enough to consider only
deviations to pure strategies. For a player i, let sji denote her jth pure strategy. Then an
equivalent definition is the following: x is a Nash equilibrium if for any player i and any
pure strategy of player i, sji : P
i(x−i, sji ) ≤ P i(x).
Similarly, a tuple of strategies x = (x1, · · · , xm) is an ε-equilibrium if for every player i
and for every pure strategy sji , P
i(x−i, sji ) ≤ P i(x) + ε.
Another notion of approximation that we will use is that of ε-closeness:
Definition 7 A point x = (x1, · · · , xm) ∈ S1×· · ·×Sm is ε-close to a point y ∈ S1×· · ·×Sm
if and only if ||xi − yi||∞ ≤ ε for all i = 1, ...,m
Note that an ε-equilibrium is not necessarily close to a real Nash equilibrium.
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4.3.1 Nash Equilibria as Roots of a Polynomial
From the above definitions, a Nash equilibrium is a solution of the following system of
polynomial inequalities and equalities:
xij ≥ 0 i = 1, ...,m, j = 1, ..., ni
ni∑
j=1
xij = 1 i = 1, ...,m
P i(x−i, sji ) ≤ P




ni. The system has n variables and 2n+m = O(n) multilinear constraints.
By adding slack variables we can convert every constraint to an equation, where each
polynomial is of degree at most m (the degree of a polynomial is the maximum total degree
of its monomials). Note that the slack variables are squared so that we do not have to add
any more constraints for their nonnegativity:




xij − 1 = 0 i = 1, ...,m
∆ij = P i(x)− P i(x−i, sji )− δ
2
ij = 0 i = 1, ...,m, j = 1, ..., ni
(5)
We can now combine all the polynomial equations into one by taking the sum of squares
(P1 = 0 and P2 = 0 is equivalent to P 21 + P
2
2 = 0, when looking for solutions over the
real numbers). Therefore we have the following polynomial which we will refer to as the
polynomial of the game (A1, ..., Am):














Claim 33 Φ(A1, ..., Am) has degree 2m, O(n) variables, nO(m)0 monomials and maximum
absolute value of its coefficients O(nH2).
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4.3.2 Finite Representation of Nash Equilibria
The fact that there exist games whose equilibria have irrational entries in their probability
distributions is not necessarily an obstacle towards obtaining a finite representation for a
Nash equilibrium. For example, a real algebraic number α can be uniquely described by
the irreducible polynomial with integer coefficients, P , for which P (α) = 0 and an interval
which isolates the root α from the other roots of P . In the next Theorem we show that
every game has a Nash equilibrium that can be finitely represented. The proof is based
on a deep result from the theory of real closed fields known as the transfer principle [9].
We also need to use the fact that equilibria always exist. We are not aware if there is an
alternative way of proving Theorem 34. The original topological proof of existence by Nash
via Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, though powerful enough to guarantee an equilibrium,
does not seem to give any further information on the algebraic properties of the equilibria.
Theorem 34 For every finite game there exists a Nash equilibrium x = (x1, ..., xm) such
that every entry in the probability distributions x1, · · · , xm is an algebraic number.
To prove this theorem, we first need the following definition:
Definition 8 An ordered field R is a real closed field if
1. every positive element x ∈ R is a square (i.e., x = y2 for some y ∈ R).
2. every univariate polynomial of odd degree with coefficients in R has a root in R.
Obviously the real numbers are an example of a real closed field. The following theorem
on the existence of roots over real closed fields is known as the transfer principle and is due
to Tarski and Seidenberg:
Theorem [Tarski-Seidenberg] : Let R be a real closed field and P be a polynomial with
coefficients from R. Let R′ ⊇ R be another real closed field that contains R. Then P has a
root in R if and only if it has a root in R′.
Proof of Theorem 34 : Given a game (A1, ..., Am), the set of its Nash equilibria is
the set of roots of the corresponding polynomial Φ (excluding the slack variables). By
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Nash’s proof [73] we know that the equation Φ(A1, ..., Am) = 0 has a solution over the
reals. Consider the field of the real algebraic numbers Ralg. It is known that Ralg is a real
closed field [9]. The real numbers form a real closed field which contains Ralg. Since the
coefficients of Φ are integers, it follows immediately from the Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem
that there exists a Nash equilibrium in Ralg. 2
A natural question is whether there are reasonable upper bounds for the degree and
the coefficient size of the polynomials that represent the entries of an equilibrium. The
known upper bounds are exponential. In particular, it follows by [9][Chapter 13] and by
Claim 33 that the degrees of the polynomials will be mO(n) and the coefficient size will be
O(L+ log n)mO(n).
4.3.3 Algorithmic Implications
We will use the formulation of Nash equilibria as roots of the polynomial Φ to propose
an algorithm for computing approximate equilibria. For this we will use as a subroutine a
decision algorithm for the existential theory of reals.
A special case of the decision problem for the existential theory of reals is to decide
whether the equation P (x1, ..., xk) = 0 has a solution over the reals. Here P is a polynomial
in k variables of degree d and with integer coefficients. The best upper bound for the
complexity of this problem is dO(k), as provided by the algorithms of Basu et al. [8] and
Renegar [86].
Theorem 35 For an m-person game, m ≥ 2, and for 0 < ε < 1, there is an algorithm which
runs in time poly(log 1/ε, L,mn) and computes an m-tuple of strategies x ∈ S1 × · · · × Sm
such that:
1. x is ε/d-close to some Nash equilibrium y, where d = 2m+1nm0 H.
2. |P i(x)− P i(y)| < ε/2 for all i = 1, ...,m.
3. x is an ε-Nash equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 35, we need the following Lemma:
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Lemma 36 Let y = (y1, ..., ym) be a Nash equilibrium. Let x = (x1, ..., xm) be ∆-close to
y, where ∆ < 1. Then:
1. x is an ε-Nash equilibrium for ε = 2m+1nm0 H∆.
2. |P i(x)− P i(y)| < ε/2 for all i = 1, ...,m.
Proof :
We give a sketch of the proof. Let ε = 2m+1nm0 H∆. Since x is ∆-close to y, each xi
can be written in the form xi = yi + ei, where ei = (ei1, ..., ei,ni) and |eij | ≤ ∆. For the
first claim, we need to prove that for every player i, P i(x) ≥ P i(x−i, sji )− ε, for every pure









Ai(j1, ..., jm)(y1,j1 + e1,j1) · · · (ym,jm + em,jm)
= P i(y) + E1 + · · ·+ E2m−1
where each term Ei is an m-fold sum. Since y is a Nash equilibrium we have:
P i(x) ≥ P i(y−i, sji ) +
∑







where each Fi is an (m− 1)-fold sum similar to the Ei terms. By performing some simple









which proves the first claim. The second claim can also be verified along the same lines. 2
From now on, let A be an algorithm that decides whether P (x1, ..., xk) = 0 has a solution
over the reals in time dO(k), for a degree d polynomial P (either the algorithm of [8] or [86]
will do).
Proof of Theorem 35 : By Lemma 36, we only need to find an m-tuple x such that x is
ε/d-close to some Nash equilibrium y. Let Φ(A1, ..., Am) be the corresponding polynomial of
the game. By Claim 33, the time to compute the coefficients of all the monomials of Φ, given
the payoff matrices, is nO(m)0 which is poly(m
n). We can now use A combined with binary
search to compute a rational approximation of some root. Suppose we start with the variable
x11. We can add two more constraints to Φ expressing the fact that x11 ∈ [0, 1/2] (by adding
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slack variables to the inequalties x11 ≥ 0 and x11−1/2 ≤ 0, then squaring the equations and
adding them to Φ). We then run A for the new polynomial and if the answer is yes we know
that there exists an equilibrium with x11 ∈ [0, 1/2]. We can replace the constraints that we
added with the ones corresponding to x11 ∈ [0, 1/4]. If the answer is no then there exists an
equilibrium with x11 ∈ [1/4, 1/2], hence we can continue our binary search in that interval.
Proceeding in this manner we will find an interval I11 with length at most ε/(n1d). For this
we need to run O(log n1d/ε) = O(log 1/ε+m+m log n+ L) = poly(log 1/ε, L,m, n) times
the algorithm A. We will then add to Φ the constraints corresponding to x11 ∈ I11 and we
will go on to the next variable. When we are done with the variable x1,ni−1, the interval
I1,ni for x1,ni is also determined. This is because x1,ni should be equal to 1 −
∑
j 6=ni x1j ,
so that x1 is a probability distribution. Therefore the length of I1,ni will be at most ε/d.
Hence by the end of this step we know that we can select a probability distribution x1 for
the first player such that |x1 − y1|∞ ≤ ε/d for some Nash equilibrium y. We continue the
procedure to determine an interval for every variable xij . We can then output a rational
number in Iij for each variable so as to ensure that x1, ..., xm are probability distributions.
Note that by the end we have only added O(n) additional slack variables and constraints.
Therefore the total running time will be poly(log 1/ε, L,mn).
2
We can also show that for 2-person games we can compute an exact Nash equilibrium
using algorithm A as a subroutine. The crucial observation is that if we know the support
of the Nash equilibrium strategies for 2-person games, the exact strategies can be computed
by solving a linear program, as explained in Section 4.2.3. By adding constraints of the
form xij = 0 and by running A a linear number of times, we can identify the support of
some Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 37 There exists an algorithm that runs in time 2O(n) and computes an exact
Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Let (A1, A2) be a 2-person game and let Φ(A1, A2) be the corresponding poly-
nomial. We can add the constraint x11 = 0 and decide if Φ + x211 = 0 has a solution. If
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yes then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which player 1 does not use strategy 1 and we
can go on to the second variable x12 while keeping the constraint x11 = 0. If on the other
hand the answer was no, then we know that all Nash equilibria use strategy 1. We can pro-
ceed in the same manner: suppose that at step i, we have already included the constraints
x1,j1 = 0, ..., x1,jk = 0. We now add x1i = 0. If the answer of A is yes we go to the next
step and include all the constraints we have already added in our polynomial otherwise we
know that all equilibria in which x1,j1 = 0, ..., x1,jk = 0, use strategy i. After 2n steps we
will know exactly the support of an equilibrium and then we can solve the corresponding
linear program to compute it. 2
This is yet another exponential algorithm for computing an exact equilibrium in 2-
person games. An upper bound on the compexity of the problem can be obtained by
the naive algorithm that tries all possible pairs of supports for the two players, which is
O(2nLPnn ) = 2
O(n), where LPnn is the time to solve a linear program with O(n) variables
and O(n) constraints. Our algorithm achieves the same asymptotic bound but is in fact
worse since the constant in the exponent is bigger than two. However we would still like
to bring it to the attention of the community firstly because it is a different approach that
has not been addressed before to the best of our knowledge and secondly because a future
improvement in decision algorithms for low degree polynomial equations would directly
imply an improvement in our algorithm too.
4.3.4 An application: systems of polynomial inequalities
Much of the research on equilibria in economic models has focused on the algorithmic
problem of computing an equilibrium. A common approach has been to reduce the question
to an already known and studied problem (e.g. fixed point approximations, linear and
nonlinear complementarity problems, systems of polynomial equations and many others).
In this section we would like to propose an alternative viewpoint and take advantage of
the fact that Nash or market equilibria always exist. In particular, if a problem can be
reduced to the existence of an equilibrium in a game or market, then we are guaranteed
that a solution exists. As an example, we give the following theorem:
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Theorem 38 Let A be a n×n matrix and ai be the i-th row of A. Let S ⊆ {1, ..., n}. Then
the following system of inequalities in n variables x = (x1, ..., xn)
xTAx− aix ≥ 0, i ∈ S
has a nonzero solution. In fact it has a probability distribution as a solution.
Proof :
Consider the symmetric game (A,AT ). It is known that every symmetric game has an
equilibrium in which both players play the same strategy. The inequalities of the system
correspond to the constraints that if both players play strategy x, a deviation to a pure
strategy i, for i ∈ S does not make a player better off. 2
Deciding whether a set of polynomial equations and inequalities has a solution (or a
non-trivial solution) has been an active research topic. Similar theorems can be obtained
for any system that corresponds to partial constraints for the existence of Nash equilibria
or market equilibria. We do not know if an algebraic proof of Theorem 38 is already known.
We believe that the existence of equilibria in games and markets can yield a way of providing
simple proofs for the existence of solutions in certain systems of polynomial inequalities.
4.4 Discussion
Another attempt to prove the results of Section 4.2.1 would be to approximate the vectors
of a Nash equilibrium by vectors of small support. It is not difficult to see that we can
approximate any probability distribution vector by a vector of logarithmic support in the
l∞ norm with error at most 1/ log n. However, approximating an equilibrium x∗, y∗ in this
manner does not imply that the approximating vectors will form an ε-equilibrium, for any
given fixed ε. On the other hand it can be shown that an ε-approximation in the l1 norm
does yield an ε-equilibrium, but such an approximation is not always possible (e.g. if the
Nash strategies are the uniform distributions).
An interesting open question is whether we can generalize the results of Section 4.2.1 to
games where the number of players is not constant. Another question would be to generalize
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the result so that the incentive to defect does not depend on the range of the payoff matrices
(which can be much higher than the expected payoff in any equilibrium).
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CHAPTER V
GAME-THEORETIC MODELS FOR INTERDOMAIN
ROUTING
5.1 Introduction
The Internet, which has become a common playground for a large number of entities with
selfish motives and varying degrees of collaboration, naturally gives rise to new game the-
oretic issues [82]. Problems that stem from Internet applications are very different from
traditional algorithmic problems as the behavior of the participants is determined by their
own goals and not by the instructions of the designer. It seems that such problems would
require techniques and ideas from both computer science and game theory. In this chapter
we focus on one specific problem, namely incentive issues in Internet routing.
The Internet is composed of many administrative domains or Autonomous Systems
(ASes). Each AS is usually administered by a single entity. For example, a corporation or
a university campus often defines an autonomous system. The connectivity of the Internet
is determined by agreements between ASes for routing each other’s traffic. The current
protocol for routing between ASes is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP works
without a centralized authority by allowing ASes to constantly announce and exchange
routing paths.
ASes can be considered independent self-interested agents, following routing policies
that serve their own interests. In particular, ASes would like to satisfy their own and
their customers’ traffic demands and at the same time they would prefer to avoid carrying
transit traffic, i.e., traffic that is neither originated nor destined to them or their customers.
Avoiding transit traffic though, may result in sub-optimal efficiency and instability in the
network and may even affect the network connectivity.
A question that arises naturally is whether it is possible to have a routing scheme which
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maximizes network efficiency and is stable in the sense that no AS or subset of ASes has an
incentive to secede. In [82], Papadimitriou proposed a game theoretic formulation of this
question by defining the following coalitional game: Given a network with a multicommodity
flow, satisfying node capacity and demand constraints, the payoff of a node is the total flow
originated or terminated at it (flow passing through a node is not included in its payoff).
One of the open problems in [82] was to find sufficient conditions under which the core of the
game is non-empty. An outcome of a game is in the core if no subset of players can collude
and obtain a better payoff for its members, either viewed as a set (transferable payoff), or
for each player in the coalition individually (non-transferable payoff).
We show that the core of this game is always non-empty. In the transferable case, an
allocation in the core can be computed in polynomial time by solving the dual program
of the multicommodity flow problem. For the same game with non-transferable payoff our
proof of non-emptiness of the core is non-constructive. It is still an open question whether
a core allocation can be computed efficiently for this case.
We also generalize this result to the case where a strictly concave utility function is as-
sociated with each commodity. In [52], Kelly proposed such a model for analyzing charging,
rate control and routing in communication networks. An optimal outcome in his model
is expressed as the solution of a non-linear program. The dual variables of that program
(shadow prices) can be interpreted as actual payments of the nodes for their traffic. Using a
similar argument as before, we show that if ASes compensate each other according to these
shadow prices, the resulting payoff allocation is in the core.
The use of dual variables for producing an allocation in the core is not new. In [16, 24,
39, 41, 47, 49, 79, 95] classes of games are defined in which a core allocation is obtained as
a function of the dual variables. In fact if the demand constraints are dropped and all the
nodes have unit capacity then the non-emptiness of the core in the multicommodity flow
game with transferable payoff follows from Theorem 1 in [24]. For facility-location games
[16, 39] show that the dual of the facility location problem is equivalent to the problem
of finding core allocations if there is no integrality gap. In some games, e.g. [95] every
allocation in the core is obtained via a dual solution. However this is not the case in our
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game. Several complexity results have also been obtained (e.g. for testing membership or
non-emptiness of the core) among others by [24, 32, 25, 18].
Incentive issues in routing have also been addressed in [76] and [34] from a mechanism
design point of view. In their models each link [76] or node [34] incurs a cost for routing a
packet. VCG-type payment mechanisms are obtained to make the links or the nodes behave
truthfully regarding the cost of routing.
In the next section we give some definitions and results from coalitional game theory
which will be used later on. In Section 5.3 we focus on the linear multicommodity flow
game and prove that the core is always non-empty in both the transferable and the non-
transferable case. In Section 5.4 we give a game-theoretic formulation of Kelly’s non-linear
model [52] and prove that again the core is non-empty. We conclude in Section 5.5 with
open problems and directions for further research.
5.2 Definitions and Notation
A coalitional (or cooperative) game is determined by a set of players N = {1, · · · , n}, a
set of possible outcomes O(S) for every coalition S ⊆ N and a set of payoff vectors V (S)
corresponding to the outcomes. A payoff vector x ∈ V (S) corresponding to the outcome
o ∈ O(S) determines the payoff of each player if the outcome o is realized. The set N is
sometimes referred to as the grand coalition.
A solution concept in coalitional game theory is usually defined as a set of payoff alloca-
tions that are stable in some certain sense. Among all the solution concepts that have been
proposed over the years, the core is probably the most intuitive one. The core consists of
all payoff allocations for which no subset of players (coalition) can improve upon by coop-
erating only among themselves. This means that once an agreement in the core has been
reached, no coalition has an incentive to secede.
We will define the core for two scenarios of coalitional games. In games with transferable
payoff, players can compensate each other with side payments. In such games a coalition S
can be completely characterized by the maximum total payoff that it can achieve in O(S).
We will denote this number by v(S). The coalition is allowed to split the payoff v(S) among
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its members in any possible way. The core of the game will be the set of payoff allocations
for which no coalition can gain more.
More formally, with each such game we associate a characteristic function v : P (N) →
R+, where P (N) is the powerset of N . Following standard assumptions in the literature we
require that:
(i) v(∅) = 0.
(ii) v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ), if S ∩ T = ∅.
We will denote a payoff allocation by a vector x = (x1, · · · , xn), xi ≥ 0, where xi is the
payoff allocated to player i. Given an allocation x, we will denote by x(S) the payoff that
is allocated to a coalition S, i.e., x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. A payoff allocation is an imputation if
x(N) = v(N). The core is the set of stable imputations:
core = {x : x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊂ N}.
In games with non-transferable payoff, compensations among different players are not
possible. In this case a coalition S is characterized by the set V (S) of payoff vectors.
The interpretation of V (S) is that it contains all the possible payoff allocations that can be
obtained by S. A coalition S can improve upon a payoff vector x if there exists an allocation
y ∈ V (S) such that xi < yi for all i ∈ S. Hence the core will be:
core = {x ∈ V (N) : ∀S 6 ∃y ∈ V (S) s.t. yi > xi ∀i ∈ S}.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core in games with
transferable payoff were given by Bondareva and Shapley [13, 94]. In [93], Scarf generalized
their result and provided a sufficient condition in games with non-transferable payoff.
Definition 9 Let T be a collection of coalitions. T is said to be a balanced collection if
and only if we can find nonnegative weights δS for all S ∈ T such that for every i ∈ N ,∑
S∈T :i∈S δS = 1.
Given a coalition S, we will call a vector u attainable by S if u ∈ V (S). We will also
denote by uS the vector whose entries are the entries of u that correspond to the players of
S (i.e., the projection of u to S).
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Definition 10 A game is balanced if and only if for every balanced collection T , if u is
such that uS is attainable by S, for all S ∈ T , then u is attainable by N .
Theorem [Scarf] : Every balanced game has a non-empty core.
5.3 The Multicommodity Flow Game with Linear Utility
Functions
As an attempt to address incentive issues in the Internet, Papadimitriou [82] defined the
following coalitional game: let G be an undirected graph on a set of nodes N with a capacity
ci on each node and a symmetric demand matrixD (where dij is the demand between nodes i
and j). Each node represents an AS and the capacity of node i is a simplification attempting
to capture the capability of the corresponding subnetwork. An outcome of the game is a
feasible multicommodity flow subject to demand and capacity constraints, i.e., a vector {fp}
where for a path p from i to j, fp is the flow exchanged between these nodes along path p.
The total flow exchanged between i and j will then be equal to fij = fji =
∑
fp, where the
sum is taken over all paths connecting i and j. Therefore the matrix F = (fij) will satisfy
F ≤ D. In the game with transferable payoff the value v(S) for a coalition S ⊆ N is the
maximum flow subject to demand and capacity constraints in the graph induced by S. In




j fij/2, where the maximum is taken over feasible flows. In
the non-transferable case the set V (S) consists of the vectors u = (u1, · · · , u|S|) such that
there exists a feasible flow F in the graph induced by S for which ui =
∑
j fij/2. Note that
for a vector u ∈ V (S), it is not necessarily true that the sum
∑
ui is equal to the maximum
flow in the graph induced by S.
Finding sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core was posed as an open
problem in [82]. In the following subsections we will show that the core is always non-
empty in both cases.
5.3.1 The Coalitional Game with Transferable Payoff
For each i, j ∈ N , let Pij denote the set of all paths between i and j and let P =
⋃
Pij . A










fp ≤ ci ∀i ∈ N∑
p∈Pij
fp ≤ dij ∀i, j ∈ N
fp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P
(7)








subject to yij +
∑
i∈p
xi ≥ 1 ∀p ∈ Pij
xi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N
yij ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ N
(8)
Here the dual variable xi corresponds to node i in the graph and the variable yij corre-
sponds to the unordered pair of nodes (i, j).
The first part of the following theorem can also be proved by directly applying the
Bondareva-Shapley theorem. However that would be a nonconstructive proof. Instead, our
proof yields a polynomial time algorithm for computing an allocation in the core.
Theorem 39 The core of the multicommodity flow game with transferable payoff is non-
empty. Furthermore, a payoff allocation in the core can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof : Consider an optimal dual solution {xi}, {yij}. For each node i define its payoff
to be:




To show that the payoff vector {pi} belongs to the core we need to show that:
(i)
∑
i∈N pi = OPT (N).
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(ii) For every subset S,
∑
i∈S pi ≥ OPT (S).
where for S ⊆ N , OPT (S) is the optimal value of (7) when restricted to the subgraph
induced by S.









dijyij = OPT (N)
by the strong duality theorem.
For the second part, consider a coalition S and the network that is induced by S. Let
i ∈ S, j ∈ S and p ∈ Pij such that p is entirely in the induced graph. Since {xi : i ∈
N}, {yij : i, j ∈ N} is a dual optimal (and hence feasible) solution to the original problem





Therefore, ({xi : i ∈ S}, {yij : i, j ∈ S}) is a dual feasible solution for the induced linear





dijyij ≥ OPT (S)

































Hence {pi} is in the core.
The above argument directly yields a polynomial time algorithm for computing an allo-
cation that lies in the core by solving the dual program. It should be noted here that even
though the dual program in general has an exponential number of constraints, it is known
that it can be solved in polynomial time [102].
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In the payoff allocation that we constructed, each of the nodes i, j receives exactly half
of the payoff term yijdij . It is easily seen that if we arbitrarily allocate αijyijdij to node i
and (1−αij)yijdij to node j for 0 ≤ αij ≤ 1 the resulting allocation is also in the core. We
should note however that these are not the only core allocations of the game.
5.3.2 The Coalitional Game with Non-Transferable Payoff
In a coalitional game with transferable payoff, we assume that players can compensate each
other with a side payment. This assumption is not justified in many cases [78].
We will show that the core of the multicommodity flow game without transferable payoff
is not empty using Scarf’s Theorem (Section 5.2). Thus, we only need to show that the
game is balanced.
Theorem 40 The multicommodity flow game with non-transferable payoff is balanced and
hence has a non-empty core.
Proof : Consider a balanced collection of coalitions T . Let δS be the corresponding
weight to each coalition such that for every i ∈ N ,
∑
S∈T,i∈S δS = 1. Consider a payoff
vector u which is attainable by every coalition S ∈ T . We need to show that u is attainable
by N . For a coalition S ∈ T , since u is attainable by S, there exists a feasible flow fS




ij/2 = ui (f
S
ij
is the flow routed for the commodity (i, j) in the subgraph induced by S). We construct
the flow f =
∑
S∈T δSf
S . For a node i the total flow that we route for the commodities












It is also easy to see that this flow satisfies capacity and demand constraints. Hence u is
attainable by N and the game is balanced, which implies that the core is non-empty. 2
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5.4 The Game with Concave Utility Functions
In [52], Kelly defines a mathematical model for analyzing issues of pricing, rate control
and routing in communication networks. Similar models have also been used among others
by [53, 67, 68]. The model consists of a network with a set of nodes N , a capacity for
each node ci and a set of commodities K. We will denote by Ps the set of paths that
commodity s is using to send flow from its source to its sink and P = ∪Ps. If a commodity
s is sending flow at a rate of xs then its source and sink derive a utility of Us(xs) where
Us is an increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable function (according to
Shenker [96] traffic that leads to such utility functions is called elastic traffic). We further
assume that the aggregate utility of the network for flow rates {xs} is
∑
s Us(xs).
In this setting, if flow fp is sent along each path p ∈ P then the total flow rate for
commodity s is
∑









fp ≤ ci ∀i ∈ N∑
p∈Ps
fp = xs ∀s ∈ K
fp ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P
xs ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ K
(9)
Note that unlike Section 5.3 we do not have any demand constraints. This is purely for
ease of exposition and our results hold even when a demand matrix is specified.
We construct the dual of (9). Consider the Lagrangian form:





























where λ = {λs : s ∈ K}, µ = {µi : i ∈ N,µi ≥ 0} are vectors of Lagrange multipliers and
for a path p, s(p) denotes the commodity that the path serves. Define the function
D(λ, µ) = max
x≥0,f≥0
L(x, f, λ, µ)
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This means that at a maximum of L over the orthant x ≥ 0, f ≥ 0 the following should be
true:






















The dual program of (9) is:
minimize D(λ, µ)
subject to µi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N
(10)
The objective function of (9) is differentiable and strictly concave and the feasible region
is compact. Hence (9) has an optimal solution. By the duality theorem [74], there exists a
dual optimal solution for (10).
As in [52, 67] the dual variables of an optimal solution (shadow prices) can be interpreted
as congestion control signals. Furthermore they can also indicate actual payments to the
nodes for routing traffic. In this case we show that payments defined by an optimal dual
solution result in a payoff allocation which lies in the core.
As in Section 5.3 we can view the nodes of the network as players in a coalitional
game with transferable payoff. The outcome of the game is again a multicommodity flow
satisfying the constraints in (9) and for a coalition S ⊂ N we define its payoff v(S) to be:
v(S) = 2OPT (S) where OPT (S) is the optimal value of (9) when restricted to the subgraph
induced by the nodes in S. This is a natural generalization of the game that we studied in
Section 5.3 where now the total payoff of a coalition is not the maximum flow it can send
but a concave function of the maximum flow.
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The question that arises of course is whether this game has a non-empty core. We will
answer this question in the affirmative.
Theorem 41 Any optimal solution (λ, µ) to the dual program (10) gives rise to a payoff
allocation which is in the core.
Proof : The argument is essentially the same as in the proof of Theorem 39. For a node
i ∈ N , let K(i) be the set of commodities in which i is either a source or a sink. We can






(Us(xs)− λsxs) + 2ciµi




















Therefore it remains to show that for every coalition S,
∑
i∈S pi ≥ 2OPT (S). Consider
a coalition S and the dual variables that correspond to commodities and nodes in the
subgraph induced by S. These variables form a feasible solution to the dual of (9) when
restricted to this subnetwork. Therefore we have:
∑
i∈S
pi = 2D(λ, µ;S) ≥ 2OPT (S) = v(S)
where by D(λ, µ;S) we denote the dual objective function restricted to the subnetwork of
S. Hence the allocation {pi} lies in the core.
2
We should also note that our proof for the non-transferable case in Section 5.3.2 also
holds when the utilities are concave functions of the flow, which is the case here.
5.5 Discussion
In [54], Kelly and Vazirani showed that the problem of charging and rate control as defined
in Kelly [52] can be seen as a generalization of Fisher’s market equilibrium problem [14, 28].
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The optimum dual variables in that model correspond to market clearing prices. Hence,
Theorem 41 on core allocations in section 5.4 is along the same lines of the classic result in
coalitional game theory that allocations corresponding to an equilibrium in the market lies
in the core [78].
The core of a game is a useful concept in a cooperative setting where all the informa-
tion regarding preferences, capacities and demands is known to all agents. Clearly this is
not the case in the Internet. Moreover, in the core allocation that we constructed in sec-
tions 5.3.1 and 5.4, the payoff that a node receives depends on its capacity. It can be seen
by using complementary slackness conditions that a node might receive a bigger payoff if it
announces a smaller capacity. It is an interesting problem to design a distributed strategy-
proof mechanism such that no node has an incentive to lie about its capacity. For related
results on algorithmic mechanism design see [76, 34, 35].
The proof of non-emptiness of the core in Section 5.3.2 is based on Scarf’s Theorem which
is non-constructive. An open problem is to find an algorithm for computing a solution in
the core efficiently.
Finally, in the non-linear model, if each commodity uses only one path, it is shown in
[37, 67] that shadow prices can be computed by a distributed algorithm where the local
computation is done on each link (on each AS in our case). We are not aware of any result
for the general case.
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